Humans may be unique and superior — and that is irrelevant
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- dc.contributor.author Páez Conesa, José Ezequiel
- dc.date.accessioned 2023-05-25T06:20:58Z
- dc.date.available 2023-05-25T06:20:58Z
- dc.date.issued 2019
- dc.description.abstract Chapman & Huffman argue that, because humans are neither unique nor superior to the other animals, cruelty to animals is not justified. Though I agree with their conclusion, I do not think their argument works. Many human beings do have some capacities that animals do not have and are greater in some respects, in the sense of having superior abilities. It is a better argument to deny that any of that is morally relevant. Sentience suffices for moral consideration, and for deriving a moral duty not to harm other animals and to assist them when they are in need.
- dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
- dc.identifier.citation Paez E. Humans may be unique and superior — and that is irrelevant. Animal Sentience. 2019;3(23):26. DOI: 10.51291/2377-7478.1403
- dc.identifier.doi http://dx.doi.org/10.51291/2377-7478.1403
- dc.identifier.issn 2377-7478
- dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/56968
- dc.language.iso eng
- dc.publisher WellBeing International
- dc.relation.ispartof Animal Sentience. 2019;3(23):26.
- dc.rights This article is under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) license.
- dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
- dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
- dc.subject.other Home
- dc.subject.other Ètica
- dc.title Humans may be unique and superior — and that is irrelevant
- dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
- dc.type.version info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion