Existential sentences with existential quantification

dc.contributor.author McNally, Louise, 1965-ca
dc.date.accessioned 2015-03-03T13:38:48Z
dc.date.available 2015-03-03T13:38:48Z
dc.date.issued 1998ca
dc.description The analysis to be proposed has two notable consequences. First, it indicates that while presupposition may play a role in accounting for the so-called definiteness restriction associated with the construction, presupposition cannot account for all of the definiteness restriction facts-in fact, on the view defended here, the definiteness restriction facts cannot be explained by a single generalization. Second, it supports the view that the notions weak and strong should be redefined as suggested in Ladusaw 1994, where “weak” is essentially equated with “nonparticular-denoting”.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdfca
dc.identifier.citation McNally L. Existential sentences with existential quantification. Linguist Philos. 1998;21(4):353-92. DOI 10.1023/A:1005389330615.ca
dc.identifier.issn 0165-0157ca
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/23159
dc.language.iso engca
dc.publisher Springerca
dc.relation.ispartof Linguistics and Philosophy. 1998;21(4):353-92
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessca
dc.subject.other Anglès -- Semàntica
dc.subject.other Anglès -- Sintaxi
dc.title Existential sentences with existential quantificationca
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/articleca
dc.type.version info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionca

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