Existential sentences with existential quantification

dc.contributor.author	McNally, Louise, 1965-	ca
dc.date.accessioned	2015-03-03T13:38:48Z
dc.date.available	2015-03-03T13:38:48Z
dc.date.issued	1998	ca
dc.description	The analysis to be proposed has two notable consequences. First, it indicates that while presupposition may play a role in accounting for the so-called definiteness restriction associated with the construction, presupposition cannot account for all of the definiteness restriction facts-in fact, on the view defended here, the definiteness restriction facts cannot be explained by a single generalization. Second, it supports the view that the notions weak and strong should be redefined as suggested in Ladusaw 1994, where “weak” is essentially equated with “nonparticular-denoting”.
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf	ca
dc.identifier.citation	McNally L. Existential sentences with existential quantification. Linguist Philos. 1998;21(4):353-92. DOI 10.1023/A:1005389330615.	ca
dc.identifier.issn	0165-0157	ca
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10230/23159
dc.language.iso	eng	ca
dc.publisher	Springer	ca
dc.relation.ispartof	Linguistics and Philosophy. 1998;21(4):353-92
dc.rights	© Springer (The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com)	ca
dc.rights.accessRights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess	ca
dc.subject.other	Anglès -- Semàntica
dc.subject.other	Anglès -- Sintaxi
dc.title	Existential sentences with existential quantification	ca
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/article	ca
dc.type.version	info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion	ca

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