Computationalism, connectionism, dynamicism and beyond: looking for an integrated approach to cognitive science

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• dc.contributor.author Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín
• dc.date.accessioned 2024-04-19T06:13:24Z
• dc.date.available 2024-04-19T06:13:24Z
• dc.date.issued 2013
• dc.description Comunicació presentada a EPSA11 Perspectives and Foundational Problems in Philosophy of Science, celebrat del 5 al 8 d'octubre de 2011 a Atenes, Grècia.
• dc.description.abstract Cognitive scientists are nowadays apparently required to choose between at least three different competing schools or general approaches: the computational, the connectionist and the dynamicist. More than three decades of unresolved paradigm fight encourage an alternative view: that each of these general approaches offer, not different explanations, but explanations of different aspects of cognitive phenomena. In this paper, I articulate this view by showing that each general approach can be taken to promote research primarily within a particular level of explanation. Failure to appreciate this fact has frequently led to largely incomplete accounts within each school. I argue that, if the articulation offered is sound, it supports the statement of an integrated programme for cognitive science where all the aforementioned general approaches have their place. Finally, I illustrate this analysis via a central theme for a clash of rival explanations in cognitive research, namely, systematicity.
• dc.description.sponsorship This research work has received financial support from the Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (Spanish government), via the research project FFI2009-08828/FISO, and from the Generalitat de Catalunya (Catalan government), through the consolidated research group GRECC (SGR2009-1528).
• dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
• dc.identifier.citation Verdejo VM. Computationalism, connectionism, dynamicism and beyond: looking for an integrated approach to cognitive science. In: Karakostas V, Dieks D, editors. EPSA11 Perspectives and Foundational Problems in Philosophy of Science. The European Philosophy of Science Association Proceedings, vol. 2; 2011 Oct 5-8; Athens, Greece. Cham: Springer; 2013. p. 405-16. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-01306-0_33
• dc.identifier.doi http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01306-0_33
• dc.identifier.isbn 9783319013053
• dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/59832
• dc.language.iso eng
• dc.publisher Springer
• dc.relation.ispartof Karakostas V, Dieks D, editors. EPSA11 Perspectives and Foundational Problems in Philosophy of Science. The European Philosophy of Science Association Proceedings, vol. 2; 2011 Oct 5-8; Athens, Greece. Cham: Springer; 2013. p. 405-16.
• dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/3PN/FFI2009-08828/FISO
• dc.rights © 2013 Springer International Publishing Switzerland
• dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
• dc.title Computationalism, connectionism, dynamicism and beyond: looking for an integrated approach to cognitive science
• dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObject
• dc.type.version info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion