Computationalism, connectionism, dynamicism and beyond: looking for an integrated approach to cognitive science

Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín

doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01306-0_33

Computationalism, connectionism, dynamicism and beyond: looking for an integrated approach to cognitive science

Citation

Verdejo VM. Computationalism, connectionism, dynamicism and beyond: looking for an integrated approach to cognitive science. In: Karakostas V, Dieks D, editors. EPSA11 Perspectives and Foundational Problems in Philosophy of Science. The European Philosophy of Science Association Proceedings, vol. 2; 2011 Oct 5-8; Athens, Greece. Cham: Springer; 2013. p. 405-16. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-01306-0_33

Abstract

Cognitive scientists are nowadays apparently required to choose between at least three different competing schools or general approaches: the computational, the connectionist and the dynamicist. More than three decades of unresolved paradigm fight encourage an alternative view: that each of these general approaches offer, not different explanations, but explanations of different aspects of cognitive phenomena. In this paper, I articulate this view by showing that each general approach can be taken to promote research primarily within a particular level of explanation. Failure to appreciate this fact has frequently led to largely incomplete accounts within each school. I argue that, if the articulation offered is sound, it supports the statement of an integrated programme for cognitive science where all the aforementioned general approaches have their place. Finally, I illustrate this analysis via a central theme for a clash of rival explanations in cognitive research, namely, systematicity.

Description

Comunicació presentada a EPSA11 Perspectives and Foundational Problems in Philosophy of Science, celebrat del 5 al 8 d'octubre de 2011 a Atenes, Grècia.