An influential proposal about the status of a verb’s agent argument maintains they
are severed from the verb’s argument structure and introduced as external arguments
via functional heads in the syntax (Kratzer 1996). Nonetheless, there are various
conceptual and empirical arguments against this view (e.g., Dowty 1989; Wechsler
2005; Bale 2007; Müller & Wechsler 2014; Wechsler 2020). In this paper, we build
on Bale’s (2007) arguments that transitivity plays a role in whether a verb’s external
argument ...
An influential proposal about the status of a verb’s agent argument maintains they
are severed from the verb’s argument structure and introduced as external arguments
via functional heads in the syntax (Kratzer 1996). Nonetheless, there are various
conceptual and empirical arguments against this view (e.g., Dowty 1989; Wechsler
2005; Bale 2007; Müller & Wechsler 2014; Wechsler 2020). In this paper, we build
on Bale’s (2007) arguments that transitivity plays a role in whether a verb’s external
argument can be introduced outside the domain of the verb. Specifically, he argues
based on sub-lexical modification with again that only eventive transitive verbs have
their external arguments severed from the verb, and stative transitive and intransitive
verbs do not. We present empirical evidence against this macro-classification,
showing that particular classes of eventive transitive verbs, namely verbs of killing
like murder, slay, slaughter, massacre, and assassinate in fact do not permit what
Bale calls subjectless (agentless) presuppositions. Given an understanding of again’s
presupposition being uniquely determined by the structural constituent it attaches
to (Dowty 1979; von Stechow 1996; Beck & Johnson 2004; Bale 2007), this must
mean that these verbs cannot have their external arguments severed, contra Bale’s
generalization. Further we claim that intentionality entailments, which are often taken
to be entailments of an Agent thematic role (Dowty 1991; Kratzer 1996), can in fact be
dissociated from the syntactic introduction of the agent argument, and that certain
verbs can lexically introduce them without directly introducing their agents. This is
argued for by examining what we call manner of forced taking verbs like confiscate,
snatch, and seize, which permit agentless presuppositions with again but still impose
intentionality requirements on their subjects. We provide a compositional semantics
for these two classes of verbs capturing these facts, and close with some speculations
about the nature of intentionality entailments in regard to Rappaport Hovav & Levin’s
(2010) manner/result complementarity.
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