On having the same first person thought

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• dc.contributor.author Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín
• dc.date.accessioned 2024-03-08T07:14:05Z
• dc.date.available 2024-03-08T07:14:05Z
• dc.date.issued 2018
• dc.description.abstract Theorists of first person thought seem to be faced with a pervasive dilemma: either accept the view that varying reference and sense are bound up together in first person thought, but then reject person-to-person shareability; or else, maintain the shareability of first person thought or belief at the price of giving up the connection between sense and subject-to-subject changing reference. Here, the author will argue that this is, in fact, a spurious dilemma based largely upon a failure to appreciate, if not the existence, at least the crucial importance of the distinction between types, instantiable types and instantiated types of thought or belief. Only the level of the instantiable type is relevant for a proper assessment of the question of whether two different subjects have the same first person thought.
• dc.description.sponsorship This work has been financed by the Secretary for Universities and Research of the Department of Economy and Knowledge (Government of Catalonia) and the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Government of Spain) and the European Union through the research projects FFI 2016-80588-R and FFI 2015-63892-p (MINECO AEI/FEDER, EU).
• dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
• dc.identifier.citation Verdejo VM. On having the same first person thought. Grazer Philosophische Studien. 2018;95(4):566-87. DOI: 10.1163/18756735-000053
• dc.identifier.doi http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18756735-000053
• dc.identifier.issn 0165-9227
• dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/59360
• dc.language.iso eng
• dc.publisher Brill Academic Publishers
• dc.relation.ispartof Grazer Philosophische Studien. 2018;95(4):566-87.
• dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/1PE/2016-80588-R
• dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/1PE/2015-63892-p
• dc.rights © Brill Academic Publishers http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18756735-000053
• dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
• dc.subject.keyword type
• dc.subject.keyword instantiable type
• dc.subject.keyword instantiated type
• dc.subject.keyword first person thought
• dc.title On having the same first person thought
• dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
• dc.type.version info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion