On having the same first person thought
On having the same first person thought
Citació
- Verdejo VM. On having the same first person thought. Grazer Philosophische Studien. 2018;95(4):566-87. DOI: 10.1163/18756735-000053
Enllaç permanent
Descripció
Resum
Theorists of first person thought seem to be faced with a pervasive dilemma: either accept the view that varying reference and sense are bound up together in first person thought, but then reject person-to-person shareability; or else, maintain the shareability of first person thought or belief at the price of giving up the connection between sense and subject-to-subject changing reference. Here, the author will argue that this is, in fact, a spurious dilemma based largely upon a failure to appreciate, if not the existence, at least the crucial importance of the distinction between types, instantiable types and instantiated types of thought or belief. Only the level of the instantiable type is relevant for a proper assessment of the question of whether two different subjects have the same first person thought.Col·leccions
Mostra el registre complet