Why can the brain (and not a computer) make sense of the liar paradox?

Mostra el registre complet Registre parcial de l'ítem

• dc.contributor.author Fraser, Patrick
• dc.contributor.author Solé Vicente, Ricard, 1962-
• dc.contributor.author Cuevas, Gemma de las
• dc.date.accessioned 2022-02-11T07:07:02Z
• dc.date.available 2022-02-11T07:07:02Z
• dc.date.issued 2021
• dc.description.abstract Ordinary computing machines prohibit self-reference because it leads to logical inconsistencies and undecidability. In contrast, the human mind can understand self-referential statements without necessitating physically impossible brain states. Why can the brain make sense of self-reference? Here, we address this question by defining the Strange Loop Model, which features causal feedback between two brain modules, and circumvents the paradoxes of self-reference and negation by unfolding the inconsistency in time. We also argue that the metastable dynamics of the brain inhibit and terminate unhalting inferences. Finally, we show that the representation of logical inconsistencies in the Strange Loop Model leads to causal incongruence between brain subsystems in Integrated Information Theory.
• dc.description.sponsorship PF is supported in part by funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council. RS thanks the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, grant PID2019-111680GB-I00, an AGAUR FI 2018 grant, and the Santa Fe Institute. GD acknowledges funding from the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) (START Prize Y-1261-N).
• dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
• dc.identifier.citation Fraser P, Solé R, De las Cuevas G. Why can the brain (and not a computer) make sense of the liar paradox? Front Ecol Evol. 2021;9:802300. DOI: 10.3389/fevo.2021.802300
• dc.identifier.doi http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fevo.2021.802300
• dc.identifier.issn 2296-701X
• dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/52467
• dc.language.iso eng
• dc.publisher Frontiers
• dc.relation.ispartof Front Ecol Evol. 2021;9:802300
• dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/2PE/PID2019-111680GB-I00
• dc.rights © 2021 Fraser, Solé and De las Cuevas. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
• dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
• dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• dc.subject.keyword Self-reference
• dc.subject.keyword Cognition
• dc.subject.keyword Consciousness
• dc.subject.keyword Computation
• dc.subject.keyword Causal structure
• dc.subject.keyword Integrated information theory
• dc.title Why can the brain (and not a computer) make sense of the liar paradox?
• dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
• dc.type.version info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion