A theory of optimal random crackdowns

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dc.contributor.authorEeckhout, Janca
dc.contributor.authorPersico, Nicolaca
dc.contributor.authorTodd, Petraca
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-24T12:56:11Z
dc.date.available2010-11-24T12:56:11Z
dc.date.issued2010
dc.description.abstractAn incentives based theory of policing is developed which can explain the phenomenon of random “crackdowns,” i.e., intermittent periods of high interdiction/surveillance. For a variety of police objective functions, random crackdowns can be part of the optimal monitoring strategy. We demonstrate support for implications of the crackdown theory using traffic data gathered by the Belgian Police Department and use the model to estimate the deterrence effect/nof additional resources spent on speeding interdiction.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfca
dc.identifier.citationEeckhout J, Persico N, Todd PE. A theory of optimal random crackdowns. Am Econ Rev. 2010;100(3):1104–35. DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.3.1104en
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.3.1104
dc.identifier.issn0002-8282
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10230/8585
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherAmerican Economic Associationca
dc.relation.ispartofAmerican Economic Review. 2010;100(3):1104–35
dc.relation.projectIDinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/FP7/208068en
dc.rights© 2010 American Economic Association. Can be found online at: http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/aer.100.3.1104en
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
dc.subject.keywordCrackdowns
dc.subject.otherPrevenció del delicte
dc.titleA theory of optimal random crackdownsen
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleen
dc.type.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionen

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