A theory of optimal random crackdowns
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- dc.contributor.author Eeckhout, Janca
- dc.contributor.author Persico, Nicolaca
- dc.contributor.author Todd, Petraca
- dc.date.accessioned 2010-11-24T12:56:11Z
- dc.date.available 2010-11-24T12:56:11Z
- dc.date.issued 2010
- dc.description.abstract An incentives based theory of policing is developed which can explain the phenomenon of random “crackdowns,” i.e., intermittent periods of high interdiction/surveillance. For a variety of police objective functions, random crackdowns can be part of the optimal monitoring strategy. We demonstrate support for implications of the crackdown theory using traffic data gathered by the Belgian Police Department and use the model to estimate the deterrence effect/nof additional resources spent on speeding interdiction.en
- dc.format.mimetype application/pdfca
- dc.identifier.citation Eeckhout J, Persico N, Todd PE. A theory of optimal random crackdowns. Am Econ Rev. 2010;100(3):1104–35. DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.3.1104en
- dc.identifier.doi http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.3.1104
- dc.identifier.issn 0002-8282
- dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/8585
- dc.language.iso engen
- dc.publisher American Economic Associationca
- dc.relation.ispartof American Economic Review. 2010;100(3):1104–35
- dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/FP7/208068en
- dc.rights © 2010 American Economic Association. Can be found online at: http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/aer.100.3.1104en
- dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
- dc.subject.keyword Crackdowns
- dc.subject.other Prevenció del delicte
- dc.title A theory of optimal random crackdownsen
- dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/articleen
- dc.type.version info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionen