A theory of optimal random crackdowns

Eeckhout, Jan; Persico, Nicola; Todd, Petra

doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.3.1104

A theory of optimal random crackdowns

Citation

Eeckhout J, Persico N, Todd PE. A theory of optimal random crackdowns. Am Econ Rev. 2010;100(3):1104–35. DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.3.1104

Abstract

An incentives based theory of policing is developed which can explain the phenomenon of random “crackdowns,” i.e., intermittent periods of high interdiction/surveillance. For a variety of police objective functions, random crackdowns can be part of the optimal monitoring strategy. We demonstrate support for implications of the crackdown theory using traffic data gathered by the Belgian Police Department and use the model to estimate the deterrence effect/nof additional resources spent on speeding interdiction.