Against human exceptionalism: environmental ethics and machine question

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• dc.contributor.author Laukyte, Migle
• dc.date.accessioned 2025-01-08T10:02:14Z
• dc.date.available 2025-01-08T10:02:14Z
• dc.date.issued 2019
• dc.description.abstract This paper offers an approach for addressing the question of how to deal with artificially intelligent entities, such as robots, mindclones, androids, or any other entity having human features. I argue that to this end we can draw on the insights offered by environmental ethics, suggesting that artificially intelligent entities ought to be considered not as entities that are extraneous to the human social environment, but as forming an integral part of that environment. In making this argument I take a radical strand of environmental ethics, namely, Deep Ecology, which sees all entities as existing in an inter-relational environment: I thus reject any “firm ontological divide in the field of existence” (Fox W, Deep ecology: A new philosophy of our time? In: Light A, Rolston III H (eds) Environmental ethics: An anthologyBlackwell, Oxford, 252–261, 2003) and on that basis I introduce principles of biospherical egalitarianism, diversity, and symbiosis (Naess A, Inquiry 16(1):95–100, 1973). Environmental ethics makes the case that humans ought to “include within the realms of recognition and respect the previously marginalized and oppressed” ((Gottlieb RS, Introduction. In: Merchant C (ed) Ecology. Humanity Books, Amherst, pp ix–xi, 1999)). I thus consider (a) whether artificially intelligent entities can be described along these lines, as somehow “marginalized” or “oppressed,” (b) whether there are grounds for extending to them the kind of recognition that such a description would seem to call for, and (c) whether Deep Ecology could reasonably be interpreted in such a way that it apply to artificially intelligent entities.
• dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
• dc.identifier.citation Laukyte M. Against human exceptionalism: environmental ethics and machine question. In: Berkich D, d'Alfonso MV (eds.). On the cognitive, ethical, and scientific dimensions of artificial intelligence. Cham: Springer; 2019. p. 325-40. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-01800-9_18
• dc.identifier.doi https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01800-9_18
• dc.identifier.isbn 9783030017996
• dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/69023
• dc.language.iso eng
• dc.publisher SpringerNature
• dc.relation.ispartof Berkich D, d'Alfonso MV (eds.). On the cognitive, ethical, and scientific dimensions of artificial intelligence. Cham: Springer; 2019. p. 325-40.
• dc.rights © SpringerNature This is a author's accepted manuscript of: Laukyte M. Against human exceptionalism: environmental ethics and machine question. In: Berkich D, d'Alfonso MV (eds.). On the cognitive, ethical, and scientific dimensions of artificial intelligence. Cham: Springer; 2019. p. 325-40. The final version is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01800-9_18
• dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
• dc.subject.keyword Artificially intelligent entities
• dc.subject.keyword Environmental ethics
• dc.subject.keyword Deep Ecology
• dc.subject.keyword Nature
• dc.title Against human exceptionalism: environmental ethics and machine question
• dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/bookPart
• dc.type.version info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion