Bid coordination in sponsored search auctions: detection methodology and empirical analysis

Decarolis, Francesco; Goldmanis, Maris; Penta, Antonio; Shakhgildyan, Ksenia

doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/joie.12331

Bid coordination in sponsored search auctions: detection methodology and empirical analysis

Citation

Decarolis F, Goldmanis M, Penta A, Shakhgildyan K. Bid coordination in sponsored search auctions: detection methodology and empirical analysis. J Ind Econ. 2023;LXXI(2):570-92. DOI: 10.1111/joie.12331

Abstract

Bid delegation to specialized intermediaries is common in internet ad auctions. When the same intermediary bids for competing advertisers, its incentive to coordinate client bids might alter the functioning of the auctions. This study develops a methodology to detect bid coordination and presents a strategy to estimate a bound on the search engine revenue losses imposed by bid coordination. When the method is applied to data from auctions held on a major search engine, coordination is detected in 55% of the cases of delegated bidding and the search engine's revenue loss ranges between 5.3% and 10.4%.