Bid coordination in sponsored search auctions: detection methodology and empirical analysis

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• dc.contributor.author Decarolis, Francesco
• dc.contributor.author Goldmanis, Maris
• dc.contributor.author Penta, Antonio
• dc.contributor.author Shakhgildyan, Ksenia
• dc.date.accessioned 2024-02-23T07:44:13Z
• dc.date.available 2024-02-23T07:44:13Z
• dc.date.issued 2023
• dc.description.abstract Bid delegation to specialized intermediaries is common in internet ad auctions. When the same intermediary bids for competing advertisers, its incentive to coordinate client bids might alter the functioning of the auctions. This study develops a methodology to detect bid coordination and presents a strategy to estimate a bound on the search engine revenue losses imposed by bid coordination. When the method is applied to data from auctions held on a major search engine, coordination is detected in 55% of the cases of delegated bidding and the search engine's revenue loss ranges between 5.3% and 10.4%.
• dc.description.sponsorship The BSE acknowledges the financialsupport of the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (CEX2019-000915-S).Francesco Decarolis acknowledges financial support from the PRIN 2017. Antonio Pentaacknowledges financial support from the ERC Starting Grant #759424.
• dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
• dc.identifier.citation Decarolis F, Goldmanis M, Penta A, Shakhgildyan K. Bid coordination in sponsored search auctions: detection methodology and empirical analysis. J Ind Econ. 2023;LXXI(2):570-92. DOI: 10.1111/joie.12331
• dc.identifier.doi http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/joie.12331
• dc.identifier.issn 0022-1821
• dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/59228
• dc.language.iso eng
• dc.publisher Wiley
• dc.relation.ispartof The Journal of Industrial Economics. 2023;LXXI(2):570-92.
• dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/H2020/759424
• dc.rights © 2023 The Authors. The Journal of Industrial Economics published by The Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics and John Wiley & Sons Ltd. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.
• dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
• dc.title Bid coordination in sponsored search auctions: detection methodology and empirical analysis
• dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
• dc.type.version info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion