Reply to Horta: Spectrum Arguments, the “Unhelpfulness” of Rejecting Transitivity, and Implications for Moral Realism

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• dc.contributor.author Temkin, Larryca
• dc.date.accessioned 2016-05-23T15:57:19Z
• dc.date.available 2016-05-23T15:57:19Z
• dc.date.issued 2014ca
• dc.date.modified 2015-09-25T11:55:17Zca
• dc.description.abstract This article responds to Oscar Horta’s article “In Defense of the InternalAspects View: Person-Affecting Reasons, Spectrum Arguments andInconsistent Intuitions”. I begin by noting various points of agreementwith Horta. I agree that the “better than relation” is asymmetric, and pointout that this will be so on an Essentially Comparative View as well as on anInternal Aspects View. I also agree that there are various possible Person-Affecting Principles, other than the one my book focuses on, that peoplemight find plausible, and that in some circumstances, at least, these mighthave deontological, rather than axiological significance. In particular,I grant that Horta’s Actuality-Dependent Person-Affecting Principle, hisTime-Dependent Person-Affecting Principle, and his Identity-DependentPerson-Affecting Principle, might each be relevant to what we ought todo, without necessarily being relevant to which of two outcomes is better.But I reject Horta’s claim that essentially comparative principles don’tapply in Spectrum Arguments. I also argue against Horta’s view that thetwo Standard Views that underlie our intuitions in Spectrum Argumentsare contradictory. I question Horta’s (seeming) position that there isno point in rejecting the transitivity of the “better than” relation on thebasis of Spectrum Arguments, on the grounds that doing so won’t solvethe predicament that Spectrum Arguments pose. Finally, I conclude mypaper by challenging Horta’s interesting contention that my views aboutnontransitivity support an anti-realist metaethics, and are incompatiblewith the sort of realist approach to metaethics that I favor.ca
• dc.format application/pdfca
• dc.identifier http://www.raco.cat/index.php/LEAP/article/view/297560ca
• dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/26729
• dc.language.iso engca
• dc.publisher Universitat Pompeu Fabraca
• dc.relation.haspart http://www.raco.cat/index.php/LEAP/article/view/297560/386542ca
• dc.rights.uri The authors transfers a non exclusive rights of distribution, public communication and reproduction of his or her work for publication in Law, Ethics and Philosophy (LEAP) and inclusion in databases in which the journal is indexed.ca
• dc.source.uri Law, Ethics and Philosophy; 2014: Núm. 2; p. 108-119ca
• dc.source.uri Law, Ethics and Philosophy; 2014: Núm. 2; p. 108-119ca
• dc.subject.other Transitivity, Spectrum Arguments, Person-Affecting Principles, Internal Aspects View, Better than, Essentially Comparative View, Realism, Anti-realism, Sophie’s Choice, Moral Dilemmas.ca
• dc.title Reply to Horta: Spectrum Arguments, the “Unhelpfulness” of Rejecting Transitivity, and Implications for Moral Realismca
• dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
• dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/articleca
• dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionca