e-Repositori UPF :: Any: 2014 Num.: 2

Recent Submissions

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Legitimate Coercion: What Consent Can and Cannot Do
(Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2014) Hassoun, Nicole
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Globalization and Global Justice in Review
(Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2014) Hassoun, Nicole
Globalization connects everyone, from the world’s poorest slum dweller tothe richest billionaire. Globalization and Global Justice starts by giving a newargument for the conclusion that coercive international institutions —whosesubjects who are likely to face sanctions for violation of their rules— mustensure that everyone they coerce secures basic necessities like food, waterand medicines. It then suggests that it is possible for coercive institutionsto fulfill their obligations by, for instance, providing international aid andmaking free trade fair. This overview sketches the argument in the book’sfirst half, as which is the focus of the papers in the symposium.
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Reply to Persson: Intransitivity and the Internal Aspects View
(Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2014) Temkin, Larry
This article responds to Ingmar Persson’s article “Internal or External Grounds for the Nontransitivity of ‘Better/Worse than’”. In his article, Persson argues in favor of an account of supervenience that would be compatible with both an Internal Aspects View, and the nontransitivity of the “better or worse than” relations. This article points out that the Internal Aspects View that Persson favors would fail to capture many features of practical reasoning that most advocates of an Internal Aspects View favor, and that the version of the Internal Aspects View that I discuss in Rethinking the Good does capture. I note, however, that Persson’s view would not only be compatible with my book’s main claims and arguments, it would substantially buttress my results. Accordingly, I would welcome it if Persson could successfully develop and defend his view. Unfortunately, however, my article raises a number of worries about Persson’s view. I consider various different ways of understanding Persson’s position, and argue that none of them ultimately succeed in establishing a plausible version of a genuinely Internal Aspects View that would be compatible with the nontransitivity of the “better or worse than” relations. I acknowledge that if Persson can ultimately make good on his claims, he will have made a substantial contribution to our understanding of the good and the nature of ideals. However, as matters now stand, I am not moved by his arguments to revise the claims I made in Rethinking the Good, correlating the nontransitivity of the “better or worse than” relations with the Essentially Comparative View, rather than the Internal Aspects View.
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Social Contract Theory in the Global Context
(Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2014) Stone, Peter
Nicole Hassoun’s Globalization and Global Justice: Shrinking Distance,Expanding Obligations (2012) offers a novel argument for the existence ofpositive rights for the world’s poor, and explores institutional alternativessuitable for the realization of those rights. Hassoun’s argument is contractualist(in the broad sense), and makes the existence of positive rights dependupon the conditions necessary for meaningful consent to the global order. Itthus provides an interesting example of social contract theory in the globalcontext. But Hassoun’s argument relies crucially upon the ambiguous natureof the concept of consent. Drawing broadly upon the social contract theorytradition, Hassoun relies upon actual consent theory, democratic theory, andhypothetical consent theory. Each theoretical approach makes use of its ownconception of consent. Rather than select one of these conceptions overthe others, she makes use of all three. In doing so, she introduces a crucialambiguity into the terms that, on her account, a legitimate global order mustsatisfy. The resolution of this ambiguity will circumscribe any effort, on thepart of Hassoun or others, to specify the terms of any global social contract.
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Firms, States, and Democracy: A Qualified Defense of the Parallel Case Argument
(Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2014) González-Ricoy, Iñigo
The paper discusses the structure, applications, and plausibility of the muchusedparallel-case argument for workplace democracy. The argument restson an analogy between firms and states according to which the justificationof democracy in the state implies its justification in the workplace. Thecontribution of the paper is threefold. First, the argument is illustrated byapplying it to two usual objections to workplace democracy, namely, thatemployees lack the expertise required to run a firm and that only capitalsuppliers should have a say over the governance of the firm. Second,the structure of the argument is unfolded. Third, two salient similaritiesbetween firms and states regarding their internal and external effects andthe standing of their members are addressed in order to asses the potentialand limits of the argument, as well as three relevant differences regardingthe voluntariness of their membership, the narrowness of their goals, andthe stiffness of the competition they face. After considering these similaritiesand differences, the paper contends that the the parallel-case argumentprovides a sound reason in favor of democracy in the workplace —a reason,however, that needs to be importantly qualified and that is only pro tanto.
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Whole number (2)
(Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2014) ,
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A Brief Rejoinder to Valentini
(Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2014) Tan, Kok-Chor
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In Defense of the Internal Aspects View: Person-Affecting Reasons, Spectrum Arguments and Inconsistent Intuitions
(Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2014) Horta, Oscar
According to the Internal Aspects View, the value of different outcomesdepends solely on the internal features possessed by each outcome and theinternal relations between them. This paper defends the Internal AspectsView against Larry Temkin’s defence of the Essentially Comparative View,according to which the value of different outcomes depends on what isthe alternative outcome they are compared with. The paper discusses bothperson-affecting arguments and Spectrum Arguments. The paper doesnot defend a person-affecting view over an impersonal one, but it arguesthat although there are intuitive person-affecting principles that entail anEssentially Comparative View, the intuitions that support these principlescan also be acommodated by other principles that are compatible with theInternal Aspects View. The paper also argues that the rejection of transitivityand the Internal Aspects View does not help us to solve the challengespresented by Spectrum Arguments. Despite this, the arguments presentedby Temkin do succeed in showing that, unfortunately, our intuitions arechaotic and inconsistent. The paper argues that this has metaethicalconsequences that will be unwelcome by a moral realist such as Temkin,since they challenge the idea that our intuitions may track a moral realityexisting independently of our preferences.
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What Do We Owe to Poor Families?
(Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2014) Arneson, Richard J.
This essay argues that when there is a moral duty to procreate,nonprocreators owe assistance in the task of providing for children, evenif their presence renders nonprocreators worse off. When new childrenbring benefits to nonprocreators, they have a duty of reciprocity owed tocooperating parents. If there is a moral duty to provide meaningful workopportunities, especially to the worse off, we have special duties to helppoor people enjoy opportunities for the meaningful work of raising children.Given the benefits of stable families for both their adult and child members,justice requires facilitating the enjoyment of stable faily life by poor people.
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Rethinking the Good – A Small Taste
(Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2014) Temkin, Larry
This article aims to convey a few of the key claims and arguments ofmy book, Rethinking the Good: Moral Ideals and the Nature of PracticalReasoning. The article gives an example of a Spectrum Argument, andillustrates that such arguments put pressure on the Axiom of Transitivity,which holds that for any three possible outcomes or alternatives, A, B, andC, if, all things considered, A is better than B, and B is better than C, then Ais better than C. The article distinguishes between two different approachesto understanding the goodness of outcomes, the Internal Aspects View andthe Essentially Comparative View. It suggests that two deeply plausible, butseemingly incompatible, positions underlying the Spectrum Argument,an Additive-Aggregationist Position, and an Anti-Additive-AggregationistPosition, reflect the Essentially Comparative View, and that on such aview they are not incompatible. The article introduces several widely-heldviews about neutrality and dominance principles, and shows that some ofthese views are incompatible. The article contends that various ideals orviews that people care about are most plausibly understood as essentiallycomparative, and notes that one such view, a Narrow Person-Affecting View,will be especially difficult to reject in at least some cases. It also illustrateshow such a view, like other essentially comparative views, threatens theAxiom of Transitivity. The article concludes by contending that we mustseriously rethink our understanding of the good, moral ideals, and thenature of practical reasoning, while recognizing that the way forward ismurky, at best.
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Two Pictures of the Global-justice Debate: A Reply to Tan
(Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2014) Valentini, Laura
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Reply to Horta: Spectrum Arguments, the “Unhelpfulness” of Rejecting Transitivity, and Implications for Moral Realism
(Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2014) Temkin, Larry
This article responds to Oscar Horta’s article “In Defense of the InternalAspects View: Person-Affecting Reasons, Spectrum Arguments andInconsistent Intuitions”. I begin by noting various points of agreementwith Horta. I agree that the “better than relation” is asymmetric, and pointout that this will be so on an Essentially Comparative View as well as on anInternal Aspects View. I also agree that there are various possible Person-Affecting Principles, other than the one my book focuses on, that peoplemight find plausible, and that in some circumstances, at least, these mighthave deontological, rather than axiological significance. In particular,I grant that Horta’s Actuality-Dependent Person-Affecting Principle, hisTime-Dependent Person-Affecting Principle, and his Identity-DependentPerson-Affecting Principle, might each be relevant to what we ought todo, without necessarily being relevant to which of two outcomes is better.But I reject Horta’s claim that essentially comparative principles don’tapply in Spectrum Arguments. I also argue against Horta’s view that thetwo Standard Views that underlie our intuitions in Spectrum Argumentsare contradictory. I question Horta’s (seeming) position that there isno point in rejecting the transitivity of the “better than” relation on thebasis of Spectrum Arguments, on the grounds that doing so won’t solvethe predicament that Spectrum Arguments pose. Finally, I conclude mypaper by challenging Horta’s interesting contention that my views aboutnontransitivity support an anti-realist metaethics, and are incompatiblewith the sort of realist approach to metaethics that I favor.
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Internal or External Grounds for the Nontransitivity of “Better/Worse than”
(Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2014) Persson, Ingmar
In his book Rethinking the Good: Moral Ideals and the Nature of PracticalReasoning Larry Temkin contrasts two views of ideals for evaluating outcomes:the Internal Aspects View and the Essentially Comparative View. He claimsthat the latter view can make the relation of being better/worse than all thingsconsidered nontransitive, while the former can’t. This paper argues that theInternal Aspects View can also be a source of nontransitivity. The gist of theargument is that perfect similarity as regards supervenient properties, likevalue, is compatible with differences as regards their subvenient propertiesand that it’s logically possible that such sets of insufficient differences add upto differences that are sufficient for supervenient differences. Thus, perfectsimilarity or identity is nontransitive as regards the supervenient property ofvalue, and this implies that the relation of being better/worse than all thingsconsidered is also nontransitive.
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Sufficiency, Equality and the Consequences of Global Coercion
(Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2014) Tan, Kok-Chor
In some discussions on global distributive justice, it is argued that the factthat the state exercises coercive authority over its own citizens explains whythe state has egalitarian distributive obligations to its own but not to otherindividuals in the world at large. Two recent works make the case that the globalorder is indeed coercive in a morally significant way for generating certainglobal distributive obligations. Nicole Hassoun argues that the coercivecharacter of the global order gives rise to global duties of humanitarian aid.Laura Valentini argues that the existence of global coercion triggers globaldistributive duties more demanding than mere humanitarianism, but notnecessarily as demanding as cosmopolitan egalitarian duties. This reviewessay suggests that Hassoun’s and Valentini’s depictions of the global orderas coercive entitle them to the stronger conclusion that there are globalegalitarian duties.
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Libertarian Welfare Rights: Can We Expel Them?
(Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2014) Goodman, Charles
In Globalization and Global Justice, Nicole Hassoun presents a new andfundamental challenge to libertarian political thought. Her LegitimacyArgument tries to show that natural rights libertarians are committed bytheir own principles to a requirement that their states recognize and meetthe positive welfare rights of certain merely potentially autonomous persons.Unfortunately, this argument suffers from two flaws. Hassoun needs to show,but has not shown, that the libertarian state would have to infringe any ofthe negative rights of the merely potentially autonomous in such a way asto require consent from them. Moreover, the libertarians could arrange theirinstitutions, justifiably by their own lights, so as to expel all indigent, merelypotentially autonomous persons from their territory. This second solution isintuitively unpalatable, but may be no more morally problematic than thebasic natural rights libertarian view itself.

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