Law, Ethics and Philosophy
Law, Ethics and Philosophy is a new peer-reviewed, open access international journal published by Pompeu Fabra University and dedicated to work in ethics, legal theory, and social and political philosophy. It welcomes clear, concise, rigorous, and original submissions that address concrete issues of public concern as well as more abstract theoretical questions. It also has the distinctive aims of (a) fostering work drawing on a variety of disciplines within the social and natural sciences, including biology, economics, history, and psychology; and (b) promoting dialogue between the Anglophone and non-Anglophone worlds
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Metadata only Item type: Item , Legitimate Coercion: What Consent Can and Cannot Do(Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2014) Hassoun, NicoleMetadata only Item type: Item , Globalization and Global Justice in Review(Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2014) Hassoun, NicoleGlobalization connects everyone, from the world’s poorest slum dweller tothe richest billionaire. Globalization and Global Justice starts by giving a newargument for the conclusion that coercive international institutions —whosesubjects who are likely to face sanctions for violation of their rules— mustensure that everyone they coerce secures basic necessities like food, waterand medicines. It then suggests that it is possible for coercive institutionsto fulfill their obligations by, for instance, providing international aid andmaking free trade fair. This overview sketches the argument in the book’sfirst half, as which is the focus of the papers in the symposium.Metadata only Item type: Item , Reply to Persson: Intransitivity and the Internal Aspects View(Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2014) Temkin, LarryThis article responds to Ingmar Persson’s article “Internal or External Grounds for the Nontransitivity of ‘Better/Worse than’”. In his article, Persson argues in favor of an account of supervenience that would be compatible with both an Internal Aspects View, and the nontransitivity of the “better or worse than” relations. This article points out that the Internal Aspects View that Persson favors would fail to capture many features of practical reasoning that most advocates of an Internal Aspects View favor, and that the version of the Internal Aspects View that I discuss in Rethinking the Good does capture. I note, however, that Persson’s view would not only be compatible with my book’s main claims and arguments, it would substantially buttress my results. Accordingly, I would welcome it if Persson could successfully develop and defend his view. Unfortunately, however, my article raises a number of worries about Persson’s view. I consider various different ways of understanding Persson’s position, and argue that none of them ultimately succeed in establishing a plausible version of a genuinely Internal Aspects View that would be compatible with the nontransitivity of the “better or worse than” relations. I acknowledge that if Persson can ultimately make good on his claims, he will have made a substantial contribution to our understanding of the good and the nature of ideals. However, as matters now stand, I am not moved by his arguments to revise the claims I made in Rethinking the Good, correlating the nontransitivity of the “better or worse than” relations with the Essentially Comparative View, rather than the Internal Aspects View.Metadata only Item type: Item , Social Contract Theory in the Global Context(Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2014) Stone, PeterNicole Hassoun’s Globalization and Global Justice: Shrinking Distance,Expanding Obligations (2012) offers a novel argument for the existence ofpositive rights for the world’s poor, and explores institutional alternativessuitable for the realization of those rights. Hassoun’s argument is contractualist(in the broad sense), and makes the existence of positive rights dependupon the conditions necessary for meaningful consent to the global order. Itthus provides an interesting example of social contract theory in the globalcontext. But Hassoun’s argument relies crucially upon the ambiguous natureof the concept of consent. Drawing broadly upon the social contract theorytradition, Hassoun relies upon actual consent theory, democratic theory, andhypothetical consent theory. Each theoretical approach makes use of its ownconception of consent. Rather than select one of these conceptions overthe others, she makes use of all three. In doing so, she introduces a crucialambiguity into the terms that, on her account, a legitimate global order mustsatisfy. The resolution of this ambiguity will circumscribe any effort, on thepart of Hassoun or others, to specify the terms of any global social contract.Metadata only Item type: Item , Firms, States, and Democracy: A Qualified Defense of the Parallel Case Argument(Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2014) González-Ricoy, IñigoThe paper discusses the structure, applications, and plausibility of the muchusedparallel-case argument for workplace democracy. The argument restson an analogy between firms and states according to which the justificationof democracy in the state implies its justification in the workplace. Thecontribution of the paper is threefold. First, the argument is illustrated byapplying it to two usual objections to workplace democracy, namely, thatemployees lack the expertise required to run a firm and that only capitalsuppliers should have a say over the governance of the firm. Second,the structure of the argument is unfolded. Third, two salient similaritiesbetween firms and states regarding their internal and external effects andthe standing of their members are addressed in order to asses the potentialand limits of the argument, as well as three relevant differences regardingthe voluntariness of their membership, the narrowness of their goals, andthe stiffness of the competition they face. After considering these similaritiesand differences, the paper contends that the the parallel-case argumentprovides a sound reason in favor of democracy in the workplace —a reason,however, that needs to be importantly qualified and that is only pro tanto.
