On the rationality of thought-insertion judgments. Philosophical psychology

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• dc.contributor.author Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín
• dc.date.accessioned 2024-06-25T12:46:40Z
• dc.date.embargoEnd info:eu-repo/date/embargoEnd/2025-06-01
• dc.date.issued 2023
• dc.description Data de publicació electrònica: 30-12-2023
• dc.description.abstract Subjects experiencing thought insertion disown thoughts they are introspectively aware of. According to what I call “the rationality hypothesis”, thought-insertion reports are not merely intelligible, but also express, or potentially express, fully rational judgments in the light of highly disruptive experience. I argue that the hypothesis is ethically and theoretically motivated, and provides two insights into the philosophical significance of reports by subjects with schizophrenia. First, the reports can be seen as evidence that rational judgments of ownership of a thought prioritize agency awareness over introspective awareness of it. This point fits with an integrative account of thought insertion at the personal and mechanistic levels. Second, rational and competent uses of the first person purely based on introspection do not necessarily involve a full-fledged first-person perspective over one’s thoughts. This suggests that agency awareness, and not introspection as such, is primarily involved in determining the reference of the first person featuring in the judgments.
• dc.description.sponsorship This work has been supported by the Ministry of Science and Innovation (Government of Spain) MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033, Grants RYC2021-033972-I and PID2019-106420 GA-100, and the EU «NextGenerationEU»/PRTR.
• dc.embargo.liftdate 2025-06-01
• dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
• dc.identifier.citation Verdejo VM. On the rationality of thought-insertion judgments. Philosophical psychology. 2023. 24 p. DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2023.2296580
• dc.identifier.doi http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2023.2296580
• dc.identifier.issn 0951-5089
• dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/60591
• dc.language.iso eng
• dc.publisher Taylor & Francis
• dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/3PE/RYC2021-033972-I
• dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/2PE/PID2019-106420 GA-100
• dc.rights © This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical psychology on 30 Dec, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/09515089.2023.2296580
• dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccess
• dc.subject.keyword Agency
• dc.subject.keyword First person
• dc.subject.keyword Ownership
• dc.subject.keyword Rationality
• dc.subject.keyword Thought insertion
• dc.title On the rationality of thought-insertion judgments. Philosophical psychology
• dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
• dc.type.version info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion