On the rationality of thought-insertion judgments. Philosophical psychology

Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín

doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2023.2296580

On the rationality of thought-insertion judgments. Philosophical psychology

Citació

Verdejo VM. On the rationality of thought-insertion judgments. Philosophical psychology. 2023. 24 p. DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2023.2296580

Resum

Subjects experiencing thought insertion disown thoughts they are introspectively aware of. According to what I call “the rationality hypothesis”, thought-insertion reports are not merely intelligible, but also express, or potentially express, fully rational judgments in the light of highly disruptive experience. I argue that the hypothesis is ethically and theoretically motivated, and provides two insights into the philosophical significance of reports by subjects with schizophrenia. First, the reports can be seen as evidence that rational judgments of ownership of a thought prioritize agency awareness over introspective awareness of it. This point fits with an integrative account of thought insertion at the personal and mechanistic levels. Second, rational and competent uses of the first person purely based on introspection do not necessarily involve a full-fledged first-person perspective over one’s thoughts. This suggests that agency awareness, and not introspection as such, is primarily involved in determining the reference of the first person featuring in the judgments.