Mostra el registre parcial de l'element Eeckhout, Jan Persico, Nicola Todd, Petra 2010-11-24T12:56:11Z 2010-11-24T12:56:11Z 2010
dc.identifier.citation Eeckhout J, Persico N, Todd PE. A theory of optimal random crackdowns. Am Econ Rev. 2010; 100(3): 1104–35. DOI 10.1257/aer.100.3.1104
dc.identifier.issn 0002-8282
dc.description.abstract An incentives based theory of policing is developed which can explain the phenomenon of random “crackdowns,” i.e., intermittent periods of high interdiction/surveillance. For a variety of police objective functions, random crackdowns can be part of the optimal monitoring strategy. We demonstrate support for implications of the crackdown theory using traffic data gathered by the Belgian Police Department and use the model to estimate the deterrence effect/nof additional resources spent on speeding interdiction.
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher American Economic Association
dc.relation.ispartof American Economic Review. 2010; 100(3): 1104–35
dc.rights © 2010 American Economic Association. Can be found online at:
dc.subject.other Prevenció del delicte
dc.title A theory of optimal random crackdowns
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.subject.keyword Crackdowns
dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/FP7/208068
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.type.version info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

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