Understanding and disagreement in belief ascription

Citació

  • Verdejo VM. Understanding and disagreement in belief ascription. Int J Philos Stud. 2016;24(2):183-200. DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2015.1126339

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Descripció

  • Resum

    It seems uncontroversial that Dalton wrongly believed that atoms are indivisible. However, the correct analysis of Dalton’s belief and the way it relates to contemporary beliefs about atoms is, on closer inspection, far from straightforward. In this paper, I introduce four features that any candidate analysis is plausibly bound to respect. I argue that theories that individuate concepts at the level of understanding are doomed to fail in this endeavor. I formally sketch an alternative and suggest that cases such as the one presented provide support for the claim that the genuine source for concept individuation is public sharable thought.

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