Understanding and disagreement in belief ascription

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  • dc.contributor.author Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín
  • dc.date.accessioned 2024-03-15T07:11:20Z
  • dc.date.available 2024-03-15T07:11:20Z
  • dc.date.issued 2016
  • dc.description.abstract It seems uncontroversial that Dalton wrongly believed that atoms are indivisible. However, the correct analysis of Dalton’s belief and the way it relates to contemporary beliefs about atoms is, on closer inspection, far from straightforward. In this paper, I introduce four features that any candidate analysis is plausibly bound to respect. I argue that theories that individuate concepts at the level of understanding are doomed to fail in this endeavor. I formally sketch an alternative and suggest that cases such as the one presented provide support for the claim that the genuine source for concept individuation is public sharable thought.
  • dc.description.sponsorship This research has been supported by the Secretary for Universities and Research of the Ministry of Economy and Knowledge of the Government of Catalonia, the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (research projects [FFI2013-41415-P] and [FFI2012-35153]) and the consolidated research group GRECC [SGR2014-406].
  • dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
  • dc.identifier.citation Verdejo VM. Understanding and disagreement in belief ascription. Int J Philos Stud. 2016;24(2):183-200. DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2015.1126339
  • dc.identifier.issn 0967-2559
  • dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/59422
  • dc.language.iso eng
  • dc.publisher Taylor & Francis
  • dc.relation.ispartof International Journal of Philosophical Studies. 2016;24(2):183-200.
  • dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/3PN/FFI2012-35153
  • dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/1PE/FFI2013-41415-P
  • dc.rights © This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Philosophical Studies on 11 Jan 2016, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/09672559.2015.1126339
  • dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
  • dc.subject.keyword Belief ascription
  • dc.subject.keyword concept possession
  • dc.subject.keyword disagreement
  • dc.subject.keyword communication
  • dc.subject.keyword understanding
  • dc.subject.keyword sense
  • dc.title Understanding and disagreement in belief ascription
  • dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
  • dc.type.version info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion

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