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In Defense of the Internal Aspects View: Person-Affecting Reasons, Spectrum Arguments and Inconsistent Intuitions

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dc.contributor.author Horta, Oscar
dc.date.accessioned 2016-05-23T15:57:20Z
dc.date.available 2016-05-23T15:57:20Z
dc.date.issued 2014
dc.identifier http://www.raco.cat/index.php/LEAP/article/view/297559
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/26737
dc.description.abstract According to the Internal Aspects View, the value of different outcomesdepends solely on the internal features possessed by each outcome and theinternal relations between them. This paper defends the Internal AspectsView against Larry Temkin’s defence of the Essentially Comparative View,according to which the value of different outcomes depends on what isthe alternative outcome they are compared with. The paper discusses bothperson-affecting arguments and Spectrum Arguments. The paper doesnot defend a person-affecting view over an impersonal one, but it arguesthat although there are intuitive person-affecting principles that entail anEssentially Comparative View, the intuitions that support these principlescan also be acommodated by other principles that are compatible with theInternal Aspects View. The paper also argues that the rejection of transitivityand the Internal Aspects View does not help us to solve the challengespresented by Spectrum Arguments. Despite this, the arguments presentedby Temkin do succeed in showing that, unfortunately, our intuitions arechaotic and inconsistent. The paper argues that this has metaethicalconsequences that will be unwelcome by a moral realist such as Temkin,since they challenge the idea that our intuitions may track a moral realityexisting independently of our preferences.
dc.format application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Universitat Pompeu Fabra
dc.relation.haspart http://www.raco.cat/index.php/LEAP/article/view/297559/386541
dc.rights.uri The authors transfers a non exclusive rights of distribution, public communication and reproduction of his or her work for publication in Law, Ethics and Philosophy (LEAP) and inclusion in databases in which the journal is indexed.
dc.source.uri Law, Ethics and Philosophy; 2014: Núm. 2; p. 87-107
dc.source.uri Law, Ethics and Philosophy; 2014: Núm. 2; p. 87-107
dc.subject.other betterness, Essentially Comparative View, Internal Aspects View, person-affecting reasons, Spectrum Arguments, transitivity.
dc.title In Defense of the Internal Aspects View: Person-Affecting Reasons, Spectrum Arguments and Inconsistent Intuitions
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.date.modified 2015-09-25T11:55:17Z


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