The political economy of transportation investment
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- dc.contributor.author Glaeser, Edward L. (Edward Ludwig), 1967-
- dc.contributor.author Ponzetto, Giacomo A. M.
- dc.date.accessioned 2019-12-13T08:46:09Z
- dc.date.available 2019-12-13T08:46:09Z
- dc.date.issued 2018
- dc.description.abstract Will politics lead to over-building or under-building of transportation projects? In this paper, we develop a model of infrastructure policy in which politicians overdo things that have hidden costs and underperform tasks whose costs voters readily perceive. Consequently, national funding of transportation leads to overspending, since voters more readily perceive the upside of new projects than the future taxes that will be paid for distant highways. Yet when local voters are well-informed, the highly salient nuisances of local construction, including land taking and noise, lead to under-building. This framework explains the decline of urban mega-projects in the US (Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003) as the result of increasingly educated and organized urban voters. Our framework also predicts more per capita transportation spending in low-density and less educated areas, which seems to be empirically correct.
- dc.description.sponsorship We acknowledge financial support from the Taubman Center for State and Local Government, the European Research Council under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation program (grant agreement n. 714905), the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (grants RYC-2013-13838 and SEV-2015-0563), and the Government of Catalonia (CERCA program and grant 2014 SGR 830).
- dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
- dc.identifier.citation Glaeser EL, Ponzetto, GAM. The political economy of transportation investment. Economics of Transportation. 2018 Mar;(13):4-26. DOI: 10.1016/j.ecotra.2017.08.001
- dc.identifier.doi http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecotra.2017.08.001
- dc.identifier.issn 2212-0122
- dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/43162
- dc.language.iso eng
- dc.publisher Elsevier
- dc.relation.ispartof Economics of Transportation. 2018 Mar;(13):4-26
- dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/H2020/714905
- dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/1PE/RYC2013-13838
- dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/1PE/SEV2015-0563
- dc.rights Under a Creative Commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
- dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
- dc.rights.uri https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
- dc.subject.keyword Infrastructure
- dc.subject.keyword Political economy
- dc.subject.keyword Transportation investment
- dc.subject.keyword Nuisance mitigation
- dc.subject.keyword Elections
- dc.subject.keyword Imperfect information
- dc.title The political economy of transportation investment
- dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
- dc.type.version info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion