The Commitment to LOT

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• dc.contributor.author Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín
• dc.date.accessioned 2024-04-19T06:13:02Z
• dc.date.available 2024-04-19T06:13:02Z
• dc.date.issued 2016
• dc.description.abstract I argue that acceptance of realist intentional explanations of cognitive behaviour inescapably lead to a commitment to the language of thought (LOT) and that this is, therefore, a widely held commitment of philosophers of mind. In the course of the discussion, I offer a succinct and precise statement of the hypothesis and analyze a representative series of examples of pro-LOT argumentation. After examining two cases of resistance to this line of reasoning, I show, by way of conclusion, that the commitment to LOT is an empirically substantial one in spite of the flexibility and incomplete character of the hypothesis.
• dc.description.abstract Je soutiens qu’accepter les explications réalistes intentionnelles du comportement cognitif conduit inévitablement à endosser l’hypothèse du langage de la pensée («language of thought», LOT), et que cette position théorique est, par conséquent, largement répandue chez les philosophes de l’esprit. Au cours de la discussion, je propose un exposé succinct et précis de cette hypothèse et j’analyse une série d’exemples représentatifs de l’argumentation pro-LOT. Après avoir examiné deux cas de résistance à ce type de raisonnement, je conclus en montrant que le soutien accordé à la LOT est empiriquement substantiel, en dépit de la flexibilité et du caractère incomplet de cette hypothèse.
• dc.description.sponsorship This work has been supported by the Secretary for Universities and Research of the Ministry of Economy and Knowledge of the Government of Catalonia, the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, via the research projects FFI2013-41415-P and FFI2015-63892-P (MINECO/FEDER, UE), and the consolidated research group GRECC SGR2014-406.
• dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
• dc.identifier.citation Verdejo VM. The Commitment to LOT. Dialogue Can Philos Assoc. 2016;55(2):313-41. DOI: 10.1017/S0012217316000408
• dc.identifier.doi http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0012217316000408
• dc.identifier.issn 0012-2173
• dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/59830
• dc.language.iso eng
• dc.publisher Cambridge University Press
• dc.relation.ispartof Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie. 2016;55(2):313-41.
• dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/1PE/FFI2013-41415-P
• dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/1PE/FFI2015-63892-P
• dc.rights This article has been published in a revised form in Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review http://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217316000408. This version is published under a Creative Commons CC-BY-NC-ND licence. No commercial re-distribution or re-use allowed. Derivative works cannot be distributed. © Canadian Philosophical Association 2016
• dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
• dc.subject.keyword intentional explanation
• dc.subject.keyword language of thought
• dc.subject.keyword realism
• dc.subject.keyword representation
• dc.subject.keyword supervenience
• dc.subject.keyword computation
• dc.subject.keyword systematicity
• dc.title The Commitment to LOT
• dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
• dc.type.version info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion