Revenue drift, incentives, and effort allocation in social enterprises

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• dc.contributor.author Vladasel, Theodor
• dc.contributor.author Parker, Simon C.
• dc.contributor.author Sloof, Randolph
• dc.contributor.author van Praag, Mirjam
• dc.date.accessioned 2024-05-16T07:45:16Z
• dc.date.available 2024-05-16T07:45:16Z
• dc.date.issued 2024
• dc.description Includes supplementary materials for the online appendix.
• dc.description.abstract Revenue drift, whereby insufficient attention is given to economic, relative to social, goals, threatens social enterprise performance and survival. We argue that financial incentives can address this problem by redirecting employee attention to commercial tasks and attracting workers less inclined to fixate on social tasks. In an online experiment with varying incentive levels, monetary rewards succeed in directing worker effort to commercial tasks; high-powered incentives attract less prosocial employees, but low-powered incentives do not alter workforce composition. Social enterprises combining monetary rewards with a social mission not only attract more workers but are also able to guard against revenue drift.
• dc.description.sponsorship We gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the Mærsk‐McKinney‐Møller Chair in Entrepreneurship at Copenhagen Business School; Vladasel also acknowledges support from the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación (AEI) through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (BSE CEX2019‐000915‐S), funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033. Part of this research was carried out while Vladasel was a Fox International Fellow at Yale.
• dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
• dc.identifier.citation Vladasel T, Parker SC, Sloof R, van Praag M. Revenue drift, incentives, and effort allocation in social enterprises. J Econ Manag Strategy. 2024 Fall;33(3):630-51. DOI: 10.1111/jems.12590
• dc.identifier.doi http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jems.12590
• dc.identifier.issn 1058-6407
• dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/60171
• dc.language.iso eng
• dc.publisher Wiley
• dc.relation.ispartof Journal of economics & management strategy. 2024 Fall;33(3):630-51
• dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/2PE/CEX2019‐000915‐S
• dc.rights © 2024 The Authors. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy published by Wiley Periodicals LLC. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution‐NonCommercial‐NoDerivs License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non‐commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.
• dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
• dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
• dc.subject.other Incentius (Economia)
• dc.subject.other Incentius laborals
• dc.subject.other Empreses -- Responsabilitat social
• dc.title Revenue drift, incentives, and effort allocation in social enterprises
• dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
• dc.type.version info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion