When transparency fails: financial incentives for local banking agents in Indonesia

Mostra el registre complet Registre parcial de l'ítem

• dc.contributor.author Deserranno, Erika
• dc.contributor.author León-Ciliotta, Gianmarco
• dc.contributor.author Witoelar, Firman
• dc.date.accessioned 2025-01-28T13:07:12Z
• dc.date.available 2025-01-28T13:07:12Z
• dc.date.issued 2023
• dc.description Data de publicació electrònica: 24-07-2023
• dc.description Includes supplementary materials for the online appendix.
• dc.description.abstract We study the effect of raising the level and transparency of financial incentives offered to local agents for acquiring clients of a new banking product on take-up. We find that paying agents higher incentives increases take-up and usage, but only when the incentives are unknown to prospective clients. When disclosed, higher incentives have no effect on take-up and usage, despite greater agent effort. This is due to the financial incentives sending a negative signal to potential clients about the reliability and trustworthiness of the product. Hence, when designing incentives, organizations should consider both their level and transparency.
• dc.description.sponsorship León-Ciliotta acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación (AEI), through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (BSE CEX2019-000915-S) and grants RYC2017-23172 and ECO2017-82696. IRB approval was granted by the LSE and UPF (CIREP Ref. 0069). Study pre-registration: AEARCTR-0003167.
• dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
• dc.identifier.citation Deserranno E, León-Ciliotta G, Witoelar F. When transparency fails: financial incentives for local banking agents in Indonesia. Rev Econ Stat. 2023 July 24. DOI: 10.1162/rest_a_01359
• dc.identifier.doi http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_01359
• dc.identifier.issn 0034-6535
• dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/69332
• dc.language.iso eng
• dc.publisher MIT Press
• dc.relation.ispartof The Review of Economics and Statistics. 2023 July 24
• dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/2PE/CEX2019-000915-S
• dc.rights © MIT Press (Publisher version at http://mitpress.mit.edu).
• dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
• dc.subject.keyword Financial incentives
• dc.subject.keyword Trust
• dc.subject.keyword Pay transparency
• dc.subject.keyword Branchless banking
• dc.title When transparency fails: financial incentives for local banking agents in Indonesia
• dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
• dc.type.version info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion