Sovereign default: the role of expectations

Ayres, João; Navarro, Gaston; Nicolini, Juan Pablo; Teles, Pedro

Sovereign default: the role of expectations

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Citació

Ayres, J, Navarro, G, Nicolini, J, Teles, P. Sovereign default: the role of expectations. 2016. handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10230/27297

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Resum

In the standard model of sovereign default, as in Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) or Arellano (2008), default is driven by fundamentals alone. There is no independent role for expectations. We show that small variations of that model are consistent with multiple interest rate equilibria. Some of those equilibria correspond to the ones identified by Calvo (1988), where default is likely because rates are high, and rates are high because default is likely. The model is used to simulate equilibrium movements in sovereign bond spreads that resemble sovereign debt crises. It is also used to discuss lending policies similar to the ones announced by the European Central Bank in 2012.