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  • Open AccessItem type: Item ,
    Competences and alignment in an emerging future after L-Bank : how the Eurosystem and the Single Supervisory Mechanism may develop
    (2017-10) Smits, René
    Starting with a discussion of a recent court judgment on the prudential supervisory powers of the European Central bank (ECB), the L-Bank judgment of 16 May 2017 in Case T-122/15 (currently under appeal: Case C-450/17 P), this paper explores the development of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and of the Eurosystem, as two formations of the ECB acting together with national authorities. The allocation of powers in both systems is analysed on the basis of the administrative and judicial reviewability of acts of the central banks and supervisory authorities; ‘intersection issues’ between national and Union competences in supervision; the role of national law in supervision and the national implementation of EU directives in the area of prudential supervision; and the measure of ‘Europeanisation’ of competences in respect of the holding of gold reserves and the provision of liquidity to banks (lender of last resort). A brief foray into the different supervisory liability regimes for the ECB and selected national supervisory authorities precedes concluding suggestions for further study and development of Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).
  • Open AccessItem type: Item ,
    Introducing an Austrian backpack in Spain
    (2018-07) Brogueira de Sousa, João; Díaz-Saavedra, Julián; Marimon, Ramon
    In an overlapping generations economy with incomplete insurance markets, the introduction of an employment fund (akin to the one introduced in Austria in 2003, also known as `Austrian backpack') can enhance production effciency and social welfare, if it complements, and in part substitutes, the two classical systems of public insurance: pay-as-you-go pensions and unemployment insurance (UI). We show this in a calibrated dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents of the Spanish economy (2014). A `backpack' (BP) employment fund is an individual (across jobs) transferable fund, which earns the economy interest rate as a return and is financed with a small payroll tax (a BP tax). The worker can use the fund if he or she becomes unemployed or retires. To complement the existing Spanish pension and UI systems with a 2% BP tax would be preferred to the status quo by more than 90% of the households of the calibrated economy, a percentage that can be higher with a more substantial BP (i.e. higher BP tax). Our model also provides a framework where other reforms (e.g. a partial, or complete, substitution of current unsustainable pension systems) can be quantitatively assessed.
  • Open AccessItem type: Item ,
    Generalized compensation principle
    (2018-07) Tsyvinski, Aleh; Werquin, Nicolas
    We generalize the classic concept of compensating variation and the welfare compensation principle to a general equilibrium environment with distortionary taxes. We derive in closed-form the solution to the problem of designing a tax reform that compensates the welfare gains and losses induced by an arbitrary economic disruption. In partial equilibrium, average taxes simply increase or decrease to counteract the revenue gains or losses caused by the disruption. In general equilibrium, the compensation features three elements that depart from this benchmark and respectively account for (i) the incidence of the initial exogenous shock, and the fact that the tax reform itself induces indirect welfare effects caused by (ii) the non-constant marginal product of labor and (iii) the skill complementarities in production. This leads to a progressive compensating tax reform, with average tax rates increasing at a rate given by the ratio of the elasticity of labor demand and the elasticity of labor supply net of the rate of progressivity of the pre-existing tax code. We also derive a closed form formula for the fiscal surplus of the wage disruption and the compensation, thus generalizing the traditional Kaldor-Hicks criterion. Finally, we apply our formula to the compensation of automation: in the U.S., one additional robot per thousand workers requires a reduction (resp., increase) in the average tax rate at the 10th (resp., 90th) percentile of the income distribution equal to 2 percentage points (resp., 0.5 pp).
  • Open AccessItem type: Item ,
    Self-fulfilling crises and country solidarity
    (2018-05) Marin, Emile-Alexandre
    Sovereign risk premia reflect investors’ beliefs for the equilibrium and off –equilibrium actions of international agents. This paper investigates the international dimension of self-fulfilling sovereign debt crises and characterizes self-interested bailouts (solidarity) and contagion. A credible bailout guarantee by a partner country or international agency can lower a debtor country’s borrowing costs and reduce the probability of belief driven default. However, time consistency undermines an international agent’s ability to commit to intervention. Investors internalise the probability that a bailout never materializes and this endogenously increases its cost. Hence solidarity will generally be insufficient to rule out non-fundamental equilibria, explaining why high sovereign debt yields can persist despite guarantees. When countries are heavily indebted, expectations of default in one country’s debt market can result in the default of its economic partner. Moreover, while large international agents are able to resolve the coordination failure, in contrast to the market, they internalise spillover costs of default and cannot credibly enforce repayment. Introducing information asymmetries results in novel on-equilibrium debt dynamics.
  • Open AccessItem type: Item ,
    The fiscal multiplier
    (2018-05) Hagedorn, Marcus; Manovskii, Iourii; Mitman, Kurt
    We measure the size of the fiscal multiplier using a heterogeneous agents model with incomplete markets, capital and rigid prices and wages. This environment captures all elements that are considered essential for a quantitative analysis. First, output is (partially) demand determined due to pricing frictions in product and labor markets, so that a fiscal stimulus increases aggregate demand. Second, incomplete markets deliver a realistic distribution of the marginal propensity to consume across the population, whereas all households counterfactually behave according to the permanent income hypothesis if markets are complete. Here, poor households feature high MPCs and thus tend to spend a large fraction of the additional income that arises as a result of a fiscal stimulus, assigning a quantitatively important role to the standard textbook Keynesian cross logic. Interestingly, and unlike conventional wisdom would suggest, our dynamic forward looking model reinforces this channel significantly. Third, the model features a realistic wealth to income ratio since we allow two assets, government bonds and capital. We find that market incompleteness plays the key role in determining the size of the fiscal multiplier, which is about 1.5 if deficit financed and about 0.6 if tax financed. Surprisingly, the size of fiscal multiplier remains similar in the Great recession where the economy was in a liquidity trap. Finally, we elucidate the differences between our heterogeneous-agent incomplete-markets model to those featuring complete markets or hand-to-mouth consumers.
  • Open AccessItem type: Item ,
    A parliamentary assembly for the Eurozone?
    (2018-05) Fromage, Diane
    On 6 December 2017, the European Commission presented its policy package on ‘Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union’. Some of the proposals it entails aim at improving the democratic accountability of the governance of the Eurozone. This paper examines how exactly this objective is supposed to be achieved, i.e. how national and European Parliaments are meant to be involved in this field. In doing so, it first considers the mechanisms that currently exist to this end and recalls some of the proposals previously made with the same goal, e.g. creation of a Eurozone sub-committee within the European Parliament or of a Eurozone parliament. Then, the proposals made by the Commission to enhance democratic accountability in the EMU are analysed, and it is contended that, overall, they are coherent with the content of the whole package, with previous statements, and with the interests of the EP. Yet, they appear insufficient, in particular because the involvement of national parliaments remains very limited.
  • Open AccessItem type: Item ,
    Fiscal rules and structural reforms
    (2018-05) Sajedi, Rana; Steinbach, Armin
    Implementation of fiscal surveillance rules relies heavily on the proper interpretation of legal terms, creating a need to infuse economic insight into legal analysis. Rigid legal application of fiscal deficit rules may curtail structural reforms, as reforms can go against fiscal consolidation in the short run. However, if reforms are expected to improve public finances in the long run, they should not be viewed as incompatible with the legal framework. Focussing on the case of EU fiscal surveillance, this paper identifies the circumstances under which the positive budgetary long-term effect of structural reforms materialize in such a way that the legal rules should be applied with a degree of leniency, allowing for a short-term deterioration of the fiscal position. To that end, we quantify the short-run fiscal costs and long-run fiscal benefits of reforms, and investigate how the design of reforms can affect this trade-off. Results suggest that as short run output losses of reforms are alleviated by fiscal stimulus, long run output gains from the reforms imply that fiscal viability can be reached within a reasonable period of time. Product market reforms are generally preferable over labour market reforms, as they have a larger impact on fiscal revenues. These insights inform the legal analysis in several regards. First, the economic analysis is in line with teleological interpretation of legal rules aimed at ensuring long-term fiscal stability, while allowing short-term fiscal leniency. Second, the economic analysis can give contours to vague legal terms, such as ‘prompt’ positive budgetary effects and the legal requirement of ‘major’ structural reforms, showing that the type of reform matters as much as the size of the reform, and that while larger reforms have larger long run budgetary effects, they also require greater leniency in the short run. More generally, our analysis calls for the design and interpretation of legal fiscal regimes with reference to the interdependency between fiscal policy and structural economic policies.
  • Open AccessItem type: Item ,
    Step away from the zero lower bound : small open economies in a world of secular stagnation
    (2018-05) Corsetti, Giancarlo; Mavroeidi, Eleonora; Thwaites, Gregory; Wolf, Martin
    We study how small open economies can escape from deation and unemployment in a situation where the world economy is permanently depressed. Building on the framework of Eggertsson et al. (2016), we show that the transition to full employment and at-target inflation requires real and nominal depreciation of the exchange rate. However, because of adverse income and valuation effects from real depreciation, the escape can be beggar thy self, raising employment but actually lowering welfare. We show that as long as the economy remains financially open, domestic asset supply policies or reducing the effective lower bound on policy rates may be inffective or even counterproductive. However, closing domestic capital markets does not necessarily enhance the monetary authorities' ability to rescue the economy from stagnation.
  • Open AccessItem type: Item ,
    Optimal government policies in models with heterogeneous agents
    (2018-04) Bohácek, Radim; Kejak, Michal
    In this paper we develop a new approach for funding optimal government policies in economies with heterogeneous agents. Using the calculus of variations, we present three classes of equilibrium conditions from government's and individual agent's optimization problems: 1) the first order conditions: the government's Lagrange-Euler equation and the individual agent's Euler equation; 2) the stationarity condition on the distribution function; and, 3) the aggregate market clearing conditions. These conditions form a system of functional equations which we solve numerically. The solution takes into account simultaneously the e_ect of the government policy on individual allocations, the resulting optimal distribution of agents in the steady state and, therefore, equilibrium prices. We illustrate the methodology on a Ramsey problem with heterogeneous agents, finding the optimal limiting tax on total income.
  • Open AccessItem type: Item ,
    Which ladder to climb? : wages of workers by job, plant, and education
    (2018-05) Bayer, Christian; Kuhn, Moritz
    How much does your wage depend on what you learned, for whom you work, or what job you do? Using largely unexplored administrative data from Germany allows us to relate 80% of wage variation to observable characteristics of jobs, firms, and workers. One wage determinant stands out: the hierarchy level of a job, summarizing its responsibility, complexity, and required independence. This variable is typically absent in other data sources. Climbing the hierarchy ladder explains almost all of the rise in wage dispersion and half of the wage growth by age. It also is key to explaining gender wage differences.
  • Open AccessItem type: Item ,
    The maturity structure of sovereign debts within a solidarity zone
    (2018-05) Soyres, Constance de
    This paper characterizes the optimal bailout maturity structure for a sovereign on the verge of a default. I find that buying back long-term debt is strictly optimal when it can prevent a default today and in the future. Otherwise, buying back short-term debt is optimal and can prevent a default only today. The paper also investigates the choice of debt maturity structure of the sovereign in the presence of bailouts. I find that potential bailouts extend the sovereign’s borrowing capacity and make it rely more on debt with shorter maturities on average. As short-term debt is vulnerable to rollover crises, it generates more default risk. Eventually, the paper analyses how potential bailouts affect ex post welfare and studies ex ante welfare-improving policies.
  • Open AccessItem type: Item ,
    Downward wage rigidity and wage restraint
    (2018-05) Wolf, Martin
    The combination of downward nominal wage rigidity and pegged exchange rate creates an externality which leads to excessive wage inflation (Schmitt-Groh_e and Uribe, 2016). This paper re-examines this result assuming that wage setters are forward looking, hence endogenously restrain wage increases facing downward wage rigidity, as in Elsby (2009). In this case, wage inflation is either excessively high or excessively low compared to the social optimum: while wages increase too strongly following demand shocks, they rise by too little following Balassa-Samuelson-type technology shocks. Applying the model to euro area countries, I document excessively high wage inflation rates in the euro periphery, but excessively low rates in the euro core, in the pre-crisis period.
  • Open AccessItem type: Item ,
    The fiscal theory of the price level in a world of low interest rates
    (2018-05) Bassetto, Marco; Cui, Wei, 1970-
    A central equation for the fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL) is the government budget constraint (or "government valuation equation"), which equates the real value of government debt to the present value of fiscal surpluses. In the past decade, the governments of most developed economies have paid very low interest rates, and there are many other periods in the past in which this has been the case. In this paper, we revisit the implications of the FTPL in a world where the rate of return on government debt may be below the growth rate of the economy, considering different sources for the low returns: dynamic inefficiency, the liquidity premium of government debt, or its favourable risk profile.
  • Open AccessItem type: Item ,
    Debt dilution and debt overhang
    (2018-05) Jungherr, Joachim; Schott, Immo
    We introduce long-term debt (and a maturity choice) into a standard model of firm financing and investment. This allows us to study two distortions of investment: (1.) Debt dilution distorts firms’ choice of debt which has an indirect effect on investment; (2.) Debt overhang directly distorts investment. In a dynamic model of investment, leverage, and debt maturity, we show that the two frictions interact to reduce investment, increase leverage, and increase the default rate. We provide empirical evidence from U.S. firms that is consistent with the model predictions. Using our model, we isolate and quantify the effect of debt dilution and debt overhang. Debt dilution is more important for firm value than debt overhang. Debt overhang can actually increase firm value by reducing debt dilution. The negative effect of debt dilution on investment is about half as strong as that of debt overhang. Eliminating the two distortions leads to an increase in investment equivalent to a reduction in the corporate income tax of 3.5 percentage points.
  • Open AccessItem type: Item ,
    Bank funding and risk taking
    (2018-05) Ferrari, Alessandro; Garcia Galindo, Carmen; Petricek, Matic; Winkler, Andreas
    In this paper we use a novel approach to address issues of endogeneity in estimating a causal effect of leverage on risk taking by banks. Using data on local bank office deposits and local unemployment we construct an instrument to use in a regression of leverage on a measure of risk taking constructed from new issuance of loans. The results (i.) confirm that due to limited liability banks increase their risk taking after an exogenous increase in leverage, and (ii.) that an increase in deposit supply has a direct positive effect on risk taking by banks.
  • Open AccessItem type: Item ,
    The effects of inflation target changes in an open economy with heterogeneous households
    (2018-05) Adão, Bernardino; Correia, Isabel
    When discussing the level for the target inflation in a Monetary Union typically questions of efficacy of stabilization of monetary policy or conditions for the fulfilment of an optimal monetary currency are in the forefront. Even when inequality is a well- ocumented fact as well as di¤erent degrees of inequality across economies this is not brought forward to the discussion. We show here that this is a consideration of first order. We build a model where this is the only fundamental that distinguishes countries in the area and find that these different degrees of inequality determine that different economies will be affected differently by a change in the target for inflation. We show how the transmission mechanism can in this case amplify the effects obtained when heterogeneity is not considered. Moreover, we show that the effects over the different agents depend on their particular characteristics and on the economy where they live in. We also obtain that a redistribution of wealth in a given country increases efficiency and equality in all countries.
  • Open AccessItem type: Item ,
    Changes in the inflation regime
    (2018-05) Adão, Bernardino; Correia, Isabel
    Typically inequality is not taken into account to assess the effects of policy changes over aggregate variables. We study the decline of expected inflation in a closed economy, and show that the efficiency effect of the decline is larger than what is usually reported even when inequality is considered. Here, the exogenous joint distribution of the households’ characteristics is an important factor behind the magnitude of the change of the aggregates in the economy. In addition, we show that the decline of inflation improves equality of welfare across households for any calibration that is consistent with the actual joint distribution of the households’ characteristics in a developed economy.
  • Open AccessItem type: Item ,
    Is a separate eurozone budget a good idea?
    (2018-05) Crowe, Richard
    The sovereign debt crisis served to highlight the limitations of trying to use a Union budget in which all Member States participate to perform functions corresponding to a monetary union in which not all Member States participate. In this context, a debate has arisen about whether the Eurozone should rather have its own budget, separate from the Union budget. There are good arguments to support the view that a new budgetary capacity should be developed at European level to support the monetary union, but this paper defends the view that it is preferable to develop such a capacity within the Union budget, or, to the extent that this is not yet feasible, to keep it as closely aligned to the Union budget as possible. In this respect, the Commission’s latest EMU and MFF proposals are a welcome first step in seeking to pursue such an integrative approach, within the constraints of the current Treaties. Looking to the future, a European public finance convention could be considered to prepare more ambitious reforms, including targeted treaty revisions, for adoption in the 2020s.
  • Open AccessItem type: Item ,
    Differences in euro-area household finances and their relevance for monetary-policy transmission
    (2018-05) Hintermaier, Thomas; Koeniger, Winfried
    This paper quantifies the extent of heterogeneity in consumption responses to changes in real interest rates and house prices in the four largest economies in the euro area: France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. We first calibrate a life-cycle incomplete-markets model with a liquid financial asset and illiquid housing to match the large heterogeneity of households asset portfolios, observed in the Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) for these countries. We then show that the heterogeneity in household finances implies that responses of consumption to changes in the real interest rate and in house prices differ substantially across the analyzed countries, and across age groups within these countries. The different consumption responses quantified in this paper point towards important heterogeneity in monetary-policy transmission within the euro area.