Talks? The effectiveness of sanctions in the ‘rule of law’ conflict in the European Union

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• dc.contributor.author Holesch, Adam, 1977-
• dc.contributor.author Portela, Clara
• dc.date.accessioned 2024-10-21T07:22:38Z
• dc.date.available 2024-10-21T07:22:38Z
• dc.date.issued 2024
• dc.description Data de publicació electrònica: 16-10-2024
• dc.description.abstract The European Union (EU) responded to democratic backsliding in Hungary and Poland by implementing a sanctions toolbox, which includes the Article 7 Treaty on European Union (TEU) mechanism, infringement procedures and funding conditionality. Whilst the Article 7 TEU procedure has been extensively studies and found to be ineffective, the efficacy of infringement procedures and the recently introduced funding conditionality – comprising the Conditionality Regulation, the Recovery and Resilience Facility and the Common Provisions Regulation – remains less understood. Drawing on the sanctions scholarship, we identify two central determinants for sanction effectiveness: the credibility of sanctions imposition and their economic costs. We then explore how they influence the effectiveness of the sanction mechanisms introduced by the EU by testing four hypotheses. The findings indicate that both infringement procedures and funding conditionality are only partially effective. This comparative analysis enhances our understanding of coercive mechanisms that can mitigate decline in democratic governance.
• dc.description.sponsorship This work was conducted within the framework of projects PID2021-126765NB-I00 of the MICIN and AICO/2021/099 of the GVA and was supported by the European Commission’s EU-VALUES Jean Monnet Network (EU Research and Education Network on Foreign Policy Issues: Values and Democracy) (101127854).
• dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
• dc.identifier.citation Holesch A, Portela C. Talks? The effectiveness of sanctions in the ‘rule of law’ conflict in the European Union. J Common Mark Stud. 2024 Oct 16. DOI: 10.1111/jcms.13693
• dc.identifier.doi http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13693
• dc.identifier.issn 0021-9886
• dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/68273
• dc.language.iso eng
• dc.publisher Wiley
• dc.relation.ispartof Journal of Common Market Studies. 2024 Oct 16
• dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/3PE/PID2021-126765NB-I00
• dc.rights © 2024 The Author(s). JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies published by University Association for Contemporary European Studies and John Wiley & Sons Ltd. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.
• dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
• dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
• dc.subject.keyword Article 7 TEU
• dc.subject.keyword Conditionality
• dc.subject.keyword Hungary
• dc.subject.keyword Poland
• dc.subject.keyword Rule of law
• dc.title Talks? The effectiveness of sanctions in the ‘rule of law’ conflict in the European Union
• dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
• dc.type.version info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion