Why do voters forgive corrupt mayors? Implicit exchange, credibility of information and clean alternatives
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- dc.contributor.author Muñoz Mendoza, Jordi
- dc.contributor.author Anduiza Perea, Eva
- dc.contributor.author Gallego Dobón, Aina
- dc.date.accessioned 2021-02-24T09:14:32Z
- dc.date.available 2021-02-24T09:14:32Z
- dc.date.issued 2016
- dc.description.abstract Corruption cases have limited electoral consequences in many countries. Why do voters often fail to punish corrupt politicians at the polls? Previous research has focused on the role of lack of information, weak institutions and partisanship in explaining this phenomenon. In this paper, we propose three micro-mechanisms that can help understand why voters support corrupt mayors even in contexts with high information and strong institutions: implicit exchange (good performance can make up for corruption), credibility of information (accusations from opposition parties are not credible) and the lack of credible alternatives (the belief that all politicians are corrupt). We test these mechanisms using three survey experiments conducted in Catalonia. Our results suggest that implicit exchange and credibility of information help explain voters’ support for corrupt politicians.
- dc.description.sponsorship Support for this research was provided by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation [research grant CSO2010-18534].
- dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
- dc.identifier.citation Muñoz J, Anduiza E, Gallego A. Why do voters forgive corrupt mayors? Implicit exchange, credibility of information and clean alternatives. Local Gov Stud. 2016;42(4):598-615. DOI: 10.1080/03003930.2016.1154847
- dc.identifier.doi http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03003930.2016.1154847
- dc.identifier.issn 0300-3930
- dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/46586
- dc.language.iso eng
- dc.publisher Taylor & Francis
- dc.relation.ispartof Local Gov Stud. 2016;42(4):598-615
- dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/3PN/CSO2010-18534
- dc.rights © This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Local Government Studies on 2016, available online: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03003930.2016.1154847
- dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
- dc.subject.keyword Corruption
- dc.subject.keyword Voting
- dc.subject.keyword Mayors
- dc.subject.keyword Survey experiment
- dc.title Why do voters forgive corrupt mayors? Implicit exchange, credibility of information and clean alternatives
- dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
- dc.type.version info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion