Debt seniority and sovereign debt crises
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- dc.contributor.author Ari, Anilca
- dc.contributor.author Corsetti, Giancarloca
- dc.contributor.author Dedola, Lucaca
- dc.date.accessioned 2018-09-26T07:04:28Z
- dc.date.available 2018-09-26T07:04:28Z
- dc.date.issued 2018-04
- dc.description.abstract Is the seniority structure of sovereign debt neutral for a government’s decision between defaulting and raising surpluses? In this paper, we address this question using a model of debt crises where a discretionary government endogenously chooses distortionary taxation and whether to apply an optimal haircut to bondholders. We show that when the size of senior tranches is small, a version of the Modigliani-Miller theorem holds: tranching just redistributes government revenues from junior to senior bondholders, while taxes and government borrowing costs remain unchanged. However, as senior tranches become sufficiently large, default costs on senior debt transpire into a stronger commitment to repay not only the senior tranche, but also the junior one. We show that there is a lower threshold for senior bonds above which tranching can eliminate default on both junior and senior debt, and an upper threshold beyond which the government defaults also on senior debt.ca
- dc.description.sponsorship The ADEMU Working Paper Series is being supported by the European Commission Horizon 2020 European Union funding for Research & Innovation, grant agreement No 649396.
- dc.format.mimetype application/pdfca
- dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/35499
- dc.language.iso engca
- dc.relation.ispartofseries ADEMU Working Paper Series;112
- dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/H2020/649396
- dc.rights This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International, which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium provided that the original work is properlyattributed.ca
- dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessca
- dc.rights.uri https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ca
- dc.subject.other Debt crisesca
- dc.subject.other Sovereign defaultca
- dc.subject.other Seniorityca
- dc.subject.other Eurobondsca
- dc.subject.other Multiple equilibriaca
- dc.subject.other Self-fulfilling expectationsca
- dc.title Debt seniority and sovereign debt crisesca
- dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperca