Nash versus Kant: a game-theoretic analysis of childhood vaccination behavior

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• dc.contributor.author De Donder, Philippe
• dc.contributor.author Llavador, Humberto
• dc.contributor.author Penczynski, Stefan
• dc.contributor.author Roemer, John E.
• dc.contributor.author Vélez-Grajales, Roberto
• dc.date.accessioned 2025-06-03T14:31:48Z
• dc.date.available 2025-06-03T14:31:48Z
• dc.date.issued 2025
• dc.date.updated 2025-06-03T14:31:48Z
• dc.description.abstract The vaccination game exhibits positive externalities. The standard game-theoretic approach assumes that parents make decisions according to the Nash protocol, which is individualistic and non-cooperative. However, in more solidaristic societies, parents may behave cooperatively, optimizing according to the Kantian protocol, in which the equilibrium is efficient. We develop a random utility model of vaccination behavior and prove that the equilibrium coverage rate is larger with the Kant protocol than with the Nash one. Using survey data collected from six countries, we calibrate the parameters of the vaccination game, compute both Nash equilibrium and Kantian equilibrium profiles, and compare them with observed vaccination behavior. We find evidence that parents demonstrate cooperative behavior in all six countries. The study highlights the importance of cooperation in shaping vaccination behavior and underscores the need to consider these factors in public health interventions.
• dc.description.sponsorship Philippe De Donder acknowledges the French ANR under grant ANR-17-EURE-0010 (EUR CHESS) for financial support. Humberto Llavador acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación (AEI), through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (Barcelona School of Economics CEX2019-000915-S) and the grants PID2023-153318NB-I00 and PID2022-138443NB-I00. John Roemer acknowledges the Institute for Social and Policy Studies at Yale University for financial support.
• dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
• dc.identifier.citation De Donder P, Llavador H, Penczynski SP, Roemer JE, Vélez-Grajales R. Nash versus Kant: a game-theoretic analysis of childhood vaccination behavior. J Econ. 2025;145(2):97-128. DOI: 10.1007/s00712-025-00898-x
• dc.identifier.doi http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00712-025-00898-x
• dc.identifier.issn 0931-8658
• dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/70601
• dc.language.iso cat
• dc.publisher Springer
• dc.relation.ispartof Journal of Economics. 2025;145(2):97-128
• dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/3PE/PID2023-153318NB-I00
• dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/3PE/PID2022-138443NB-I00
• dc.rights This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article¿s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article¿s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
• dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
• dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• dc.subject.keyword Kantian equilibrium
• dc.subject.keyword Nash equilibrium
• dc.subject.keyword Measles vaccination
• dc.subject.keyword Freerider problem
• dc.title Nash versus Kant: a game-theoretic analysis of childhood vaccination behavior
• dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
• dc.type.version info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion