Exploring the effects of foreign partisan election intervention on corruption

Abstract

Foreign partisan election intervention is a persistent tactic that may become increasingly prevalent as technological advancements and the growth of social media facilitate new low-cost, yet effective mechanisms for intervention. Despite expansive documentation of numerous cases of foreign partisan election intervention, there has been little systematic research on its effects, largely due to lack of sufficient data. This paper leverages the recently published Partisan Electoral Interventions by the Great Powers dataset to contribute to filling this gap. Specifically, this paper is an exploration of the effects of foreign partisan election intervention on changes in corruption levels. I hypothesize that because elections are important accountability mechanisms, tampering with them via foreign partisan intervention can facilitate the growth of corruption in targeted states. In particular, covert interventions typically require cooperation between the intervener and the beneficiary, and so they support politicians who are willing to engage in illicit activity to attain power who may be more likely to engage in corruption once in office. Election interventions can propel these candidates into office as challengers or shield corrupt incumbents from consequences and allow them to retain power. I find that successful covert intervention slightly increases the likelihood of corruption growth, with larger effects when the intervention benefits a challenger, and when the targeted state has a relatively low level of democracy.