Preference constellations in EU–Russian crisis bargaining over Syria and Ukraine

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• dc.contributor.author Driedger, Jonas J.
• dc.contributor.author Krotz, Ulrich
• dc.date.accessioned 2023-11-20T09:03:44Z
• dc.date.available 2023-11-20T09:03:44Z
• dc.date.issued 2024
• dc.description.abstract The Russian invasion of Ukraine in early 2022 and the ensuing EU–Russian clash over the fate of Ukraine highlight the importance of explaining the outcomes of EU–Russian crisis bargaining. Complementing existing accounts, we argue that favourable preference constellations are key: The more determined, united and focused side prevails over its less interested, divided or unfocused counterpart. We first establish the inferiority of Russia's influence assets (economic, military, normative and allies) relative to the EU. We then use congruence analysis to reverse-engineer crisis bargaining outcomes in key cases of EU–Russian crisis bargaining, showing that favourable preference constellations allowed Russia, despite inferior assets and EU opposition, to ensure Syrian dictator Assad's political survival, finalize the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and keep Donbass out of Kyiv's control since then. Finally, we discuss the implications of these findings for related areas, as well as for current and future EU–Russian crisis bargaining, specifically over Ukraine.
• dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
• dc.identifier.citation Driedger JJ, Krotz U. Preference constellations in EU–Russian crisis bargaining over Syria and Ukraine. J Common Mark Stud. 2024 Mar;62(2):487-507. DOI: 10.1111/jcms.13513
• dc.identifier.doi http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13513
• dc.identifier.issn 0021-9886
• dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/58315
• dc.language.iso eng
• dc.publisher Wiley
• dc.relation.ispartof Journal of common market studies. 2024 Mar;62(2):487-507
• dc.rights © 2023 The Authors. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies published by University Association for Contemporary European Studies and John Wiley & SonsLtd. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which permits use and distribution in anymedium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.
• dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
• dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
• dc.subject.keyword Crisis bargaining
• dc.subject.keyword EU foreign and security policy
• dc.subject.keyword EU-Russian relations
• dc.subject.keyword Syria
• dc.subject.keyword Ukraine
• dc.title Preference constellations in EU–Russian crisis bargaining over Syria and Ukraine
• dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
• dc.type.version info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion