Fiscal unions redux
Mostra el registre complet Registre parcial de l'ítem
- dc.contributor.author Kehoe, Patrick J.ca
- dc.contributor.author Pastorino, Elenaca
- dc.date.accessioned 2016-07-11T10:52:23Z
- dc.date.available 2016-07-11T10:52:23Z
- dc.date.issued 2015-11
- dc.description.abstract Before the advent of sophisticated international financial markets, the widely accepted belief was that within a monetary union, a union-wide authority orchestrating fiscal transfers between countries is necessary to provide adequate insurance against country-specific economic fluctuations. This belief prompts a question: Do sophisticated international financial markets obviate the need for such an active union-wide authority? We argue that they do. Specifically, we show that in a benchmark economy with no international financial markets, an activist union-wide authority is necessary to achieve desirable outcomes. With sophisticated financial markets, however, such an authority is unnecessary if its only goal is to provide cross-country insurance. Since restricting the set of policy instruments available to member countries does not create a social externality across them, this result holds in a wide variety of settings. Finally, we establish that an activist union-wide authority concerned just with providing insurance across member countries is needed only when individual countries are either unable or unwilling to pursue desirable policies.ca
- dc.description.sponsorship The ADEMU Working Paper Series is being supported by the European Commission Horizon 2020 European Union funding for Research & Innovation, grant agreement No 649396.
- dc.format.mimetype application/pdfca
- dc.identifier.citation Kehoe, Patrick J.; Pastorino, Elena. Fiscal unions redux. 2015 http://hdl.handle.net/10230/27023
- dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/27023
- dc.language.iso engca
- dc.publisher Universitat Pompeu Fabraca
- dc.relation.ispartofseries Ademu Working Papers Series;12
- dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/H2020/649396
- dc.rights This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International, which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium provided that the original work is properlyattributed.ca
- dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessca
- dc.rights.uri https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ca
- dc.subject.keyword International transfers
- dc.subject.keyword Optimal currency area
- dc.subject.keyword International financial markets
- dc.subject.keyword Fiscal externalities
- dc.subject.keyword Cross-country externalities
- dc.title Fiscal unions reduxca
- dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperca