When half a boycott makes a winner: on Eurovision voting
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- dc.contributor.author Frug, Alexander
- dc.date.accessioned 2025-10-21T16:28:45Z
- dc.date.available 2025-10-21T16:28:45Z
- dc.date.issued 2025
- dc.date.updated 2025-10-21T16:28:44Z
- dc.description.abstract Boycotts are meant to isolate. A pushback -however small- is almost always inevitable. In settings with many alternatives, boycott tends to be diffuse, while counter-support is concentrated. This asymmetry can translate into a great advantage for the boycotted party.
- dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
- dc.identifier.citation Frug A. When half a boycott makes a winner: on Eurovision voting. Econ Lett. 2025;256:112639. DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112639
- dc.identifier.doi http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112639
- dc.identifier.issn 0165-1765
- dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/71615
- dc.language.iso eng
- dc.publisher Elsevier
- dc.relation.ispartof Economics Letters. 2025;256:112639
- dc.rights © 2025 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
- dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
- dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
- dc.subject.keyword Boycott
- dc.subject.keyword Weak backlash
- dc.subject.keyword Voting
- dc.subject.keyword Coordination failure
- dc.title When half a boycott makes a winner: on Eurovision voting
- dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
- dc.type.version info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion