Social capital, government expenditures, and growth

Mostra el registre complet Registre parcial de l'ítem

• dc.contributor.author Ponzetto, Giacomo A. M.
• dc.contributor.author Troiano, Ugo Antonio
• dc.date.accessioned 2025-04-29T06:57:00Z
• dc.date.embargoEnd info:eu-repo/date/embargoEnd/2026-07-24
• dc.date.issued 2025
• dc.description Supplementary materials files: online appendix; replication data.
• dc.description.abstract This paper shows that social capital increases economic growth by raising government investment in human capital through better political incentives and selection. We provide empirical evidence that a greater share of output is spent on public education where social capital is higher, both across countries and across U.S. states. We develop a theoretical model of stochastic endogenous growth with imperfect political agency. Only some people correctly anticipate the future returns to current spending on public education. Greater social diffusion of information makes this knowledge more widespread among voters. As a result, social capital alleviates myopic political incentives to underinvest in human capital. It also helps voters select politicians who ensure high productivity in public education. Through this mechanism, we show that social capital raises the equilibrium growth rate of output and reduces its volatility.
• dc.description.sponsorship We are grateful for their helpful comments to Jordi Galí, Jim Hines, Joel Slemrod, and seminar participants at the Catholic University of Milan, CRENoS, ESSIM, the RES, the SED, and the Universities of Bozen/Bolzano, California Riverside, Glasgow, Kentucky, Michigan and Paris 1 Panthéon–Sorbonne. Ponzetto acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (grant JCI-2010-08414), the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness and its Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (grants SEV-2011-0075, RYC-2013-12838, ECO-2014-59805-P and SEV-2015-0563), the Government of Catalonia and its CERCA Programme (grants 2009 SGR 1157 and 2014 SGR 830), and the BBVA Foundation through its first grant for Researchers, Innovators and Cultural Creators. Troiano acknowledges financial support from the University of Michigan, the Harvard Department of Economics, the Harvard Multidisciplinary Program in Inequality and Social Policy, and the Bank of Italy. We thank Dante Donati, Chiara Ferrero, and Alex Wolfe for research assistance. The opinions expressed in this project belong to the authors and the BBVA Foundation is not responsible for them. Ponzetto is a CEPR Research Fellow.
• dc.embargo.liftdate 2026-07-24
• dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
• dc.identifier.citation Ponzetto GAM, Troiano UA. Social capital, government expenditures, and growth. J Eur Econ Assoc. 2025 Apr;23(2):632-81. DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvae043
• dc.identifier.doi http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvae043
• dc.identifier.issn 1542-4766
• dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/70228
• dc.language.iso eng
• dc.publisher Oxford University Press
• dc.relation.ispartof Journal of the European Economic Association. 2025 Apr;23(2):632-81
• dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/1PE/ECO-2014-59805-P
• dc.rights © Oxford University Press. This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in Journal of the European Economic Association following peer review. The version of record Ponzetto GAM, Troiano UA. Social capital, government expenditures, and growth. J Eur Econ Assoc. 2025 Apr;23(2):632-81. DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvae043 is available online at: https://academic.oup.com/jeea/article/23/2/632/7720519 and https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvae043.
• dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccess
• dc.subject.keyword Social capital
• dc.subject.keyword Education expenditure
• dc.subject.keyword Economic growth
• dc.subject.keyword Elections
• dc.subject.keyword Government expenditure
• dc.subject.keyword Imperfect information
• dc.title Social capital, government expenditures, and growth
• dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
• dc.type.version info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion