On the self-ascription of deafferented bodily action

Mostra el registre complet Registre parcial de l'ítem

  • dc.contributor.author Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín
  • dc.date.accessioned 2024-07-02T06:24:43Z
  • dc.date.issued 2023
  • dc.description.abstract Subjects suffering from extreme peripheral deafferentation can recruit vision to perform a significant range of basic physical actions with limbs they can’t proprioceptively feel. Self-ascriptions of deafferented action – just as deafferented action itself – fundamentally depend, therefore, on visual information of limb position and movement. But what’s the significance of this result for the concept of self patently at work in these self-ascriptions? In this paper, I argue that these cases show that bodily awareness grounding employment of the self-concept in self-ascriptions of action can be fundamentally third-personal and concern a body that is not presented as one’s own, but as an object among others.
  • dc.description.sponsorship This work has benefited from the support of the Ministry of Science and Innovation (Government of Spain) MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033, Grants RYC2021-033972-I and PID2019-106420GA-100, and the European Union «NextGenerationEU»/PRTR.
  • dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
  • dc.identifier.citation Verdejo VM. On the self-ascription of deafferented bodily action. Philos Explor. 2023;26(3):324-42. DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2023.2175021
  • dc.identifier.doi http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2023.2175021
  • dc.identifier.issn 1386-9795
  • dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/60634
  • dc.language.iso eng
  • dc.publisher Taylor & Francis
  • dc.relation.ispartof Philosophical Explorations. 2023;26(3):324-42.
  • dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/2PE/PID2019-106420GA-100
  • dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/3PE/RYC2021-033972-I
  • dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/2PE/PID2019-106420GA-100
  • dc.rights © This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Explorations on 27 Feb 2023, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/13869795.2023.2175021
  • dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
  • dc.subject.keyword Bodily self
  • dc.subject.keyword Deafferentation
  • dc.subject.keyword First person
  • dc.subject.keyword Third person
  • dc.subject.keyword Self-concept
  • dc.title On the self-ascription of deafferented bodily action
  • dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
  • dc.type.version info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion