‘Divide et Impera’?: office accumulation in state-wide parties and the process of decentralization in Spain

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• dc.contributor.author Astudillo Ruiz, Javier
• dc.date.accessioned 2021-06-30T08:17:04Z
• dc.date.available 2021-06-30T08:17:04Z
• dc.date.issued 2012
• dc.description.abstract Most recent studies about internal power distribution within state-wide parties in previous unitary countries, like Spain, show that they have changed less than was initially expected. But how national party leaders are able to counteract the decentralizing pressures that the first studies in this field underlined must still be explained. In this article we reformulate a mechanism for national political leaders to keep their parliamentary parties under control that Van Biezen has suggested for new European democracies. We argue that keeping party and public offices apart at the regional level is a vital part of a chain of command whereby national party leaders are able to control their party's regional governments. Using a quantitative analysis of national and regional elites for the first time we show that office overlapping is thus substantially less intense at the regional level than at the national level in the two main Spanish state-wide parties, and that this feature is related to regional politicians' degree of autonomy. Still, this ‘divide et impera’ strategy is employed less over time.en
• dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
• dc.identifier.citation Astudillo J. ‘Divide et Impera’?: office accumulation in state-wide parties and the process of decentralization in Spain. Regional & Federal Studies. 2012 Mar 16;22(1):25-44. DOI: 10.1080/13597566.2012.652419
• dc.identifier.doi http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13597566.2012.652419
• dc.identifier.issn 1359-7566
• dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/48020
• dc.language.iso eng
• dc.publisher Taylor & Francis
• dc.relation.ispartof Regional & Federal Studies. 2012 Mar 16;22(1):25-44
• dc.rights © This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Regional & Federal Studies on 2012 Mar 16, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/13597566.2012.652419
• dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
• dc.subject.keyword Political partiesen
• dc.subject.keyword Decentralizationen
• dc.subject.keyword Office accumulationen
• dc.subject.keyword New democraciesen
• dc.title ‘Divide et Impera’?: office accumulation in state-wide parties and the process of decentralization in Spainen
• dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
• dc.type.version info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion