Media attention and strategic timing in politics: evidence from U.S. presidential executive orders

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• dc.contributor.author Djourelova, Milena
• dc.contributor.author Durante, Ruben, 1978-
• dc.date.accessioned 2022-05-23T08:16:21Z
• dc.date.available 2022-05-23T08:16:21Z
• dc.date.issued 2022
• dc.description Includes supplementary materials for the online appendix.
• dc.description.abstract Do politicians tend to adopt unpopular policies when the media and the public are distracted by other events? We examine this question by analyzing the timing of executive orders signed by U.S. presidents over the past four decades. We find robust evidence that executive orders are more likely to be signed on the eve of days when the news is dominated by other important stories that can crowd out coverage of executive orders. This relationship only holds in periods of divided government when unilateral presidential actions are more likely to be criticized by Congress. The effect is driven by executive orders that are more likely to make the news and to attract negative publicity, particularly those on topics on which president and Congress disagree. Finally, the timing of executive orders appears to be related to predictable news but not unpredictable ones, which suggests it results from a deliberate and forward-looking PR strategy.
• dc.description.sponsorship We acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D SEV-2015-0563 (Durante), and through Predoctoral Grant BES2016-076728 (Djourelova). This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 researchand innovation program under grant agreement No 759885.
• dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
• dc.identifier.citation Djourelova M, Durante R. Media attention and strategic timing in politics: evidence from U.S. presidential executive orders. American Journal of Political Science. 2022 Oct;66(4):813-34. DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12683
• dc.identifier.doi http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12683
• dc.identifier.issn 0092-5853
• dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/53203
• dc.language.iso eng
• dc.publisher Wiley
• dc.relation.ispartof American Journal of Political Science. 2022 Oct;66(4):813-34
• dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/H2020/759885
• dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/1PE/SEV-2015-0563
• dc.rights © 2021 The Authors. American Journal of Political Science published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of Midwest Political Science Association. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permitsuse and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.
• dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
• dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
• dc.subject.other Comunicació -- Aspectes polítics
• dc.subject.other Mitjans de comunicació de massa
• dc.subject.other Legislació per decrets -- Estats Units d'Amèrica
• dc.title Media attention and strategic timing in politics: evidence from U.S. presidential executive orders
• dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
• dc.type.version info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion