The power of requests in a redistribution game: an experimental study

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• dc.contributor.author Pedersini, Riccardo
• dc.contributor.author Nagel, Rosemarie
• dc.contributor.author Le Menestrel, Marc
• dc.date.accessioned 2020-05-26T09:48:22Z
• dc.date.available 2020-05-26T09:48:22Z
• dc.date.issued 2019
• dc.description.abstract In most situations of voluntary contribution people are willing to give at the beginning, however contribution rates decay over time. In a new setup we introduce non-enforceable sharing rules, as requests, in a repeated redistribution game (called tip pooling). Three experimental treatments differ by the requested amount of sharing of privately known random endowments (tips), with one player never receiving any endowment. Using a hurdle model, we find no significant difference in free riding between the three sharing rules, but strong differences in positive contributions which, however, are lower than the rules prescribe. Furthermore, the average positive contribution remains stable over time, while free riding tends to increase.en
• dc.description.sponsorship R.N.’s and M.L.M.’s grants SEJ2005-08391, ECO2014-56154-P of the Spanish Ministry of Education.
• dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
• dc.identifier.citation Pedersini R, Nagel R, Le Menestrel M. The power of requests in a redistribution game: an experimental study. Games. 2019 Jul 1;10(3):27. DOI: 10.3390/g10030027
• dc.identifier.doi http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g10030027
• dc.identifier.issn 2073-4336
• dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/44820
• dc.language.iso eng
• dc.publisher MDPI
• dc.relation.ispartof Games. 2019 Jul 1;10(3):27
• dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/2PN/SEJ2005-08391
• dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/1PE/ECO2014-56154-P
• dc.rights © 2019 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
• dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
• dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• dc.subject.keyword Redistributionen
• dc.subject.keyword Ethicsen
• dc.subject.keyword Deontological valuesen
• dc.subject.keyword Social normsen
• dc.subject.keyword Non-enforceable ruleen
• dc.subject.keyword Equityen
• dc.subject.keyword Tip poolingen
• dc.subject.keyword Hurdle modelen
• dc.title The power of requests in a redistribution game: an experimental studyen
• dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
• dc.type.version info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion