The 'kill zone': when a platform copies to eliminate a potential threat

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• dc.contributor.author Motta, Massimo
• dc.contributor.author Shelegia, Sandro
• dc.date.accessioned 2025-06-30T15:43:29Z
• dc.date.available 2025-06-30T15:43:29Z
• dc.date.issued 2024
• dc.date.updated 2025-06-30T15:43:28Z
• dc.description Data de publicació electrònica: 23-09-2024
• dc.description.abstract A monopoly platform may prevent a startup which sells a complementary product from developing a competing platform by copying it. Imitation reduces the potential rival's profits from the new platform and thus its incentives to invest. The anticipation of the incumbent's aggressive behavior may also create an 'ex ante' effect, by inducing the rival not to challenge the incumbent with a new platform (i.e., not to enter the 'kill zone') and to develop another (noncompeting) product instead. This finding is robust to several extensions.
• dc.description.sponsorship We have benefited from the BBVA Foundation for a grant within the program "Ayudas Fundacion BBVA a Equipos de Investigacion Cientifica 2019." We also acknowledge financial aid from the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación (AEI) and FEDER (project ECO2016-76998-P) and from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (Barcelona School of Economics CEX2019-000915-S), funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033. Shelegia acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through the research grant RYC-2016-20307 and from the European Commission via ERC grant for the project FAPoD (101044072).
• dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
• dc.identifier.citation Motta M, Shelegia S. The 'kill zone': when a platform copies to eliminate a potential threat. J Econ Manag Strategy. 2024 Sep 23. DOI: 10.1111/jems.12614
• dc.identifier.doi http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jems.12614
• dc.identifier.issn 1058-6407
• dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/70799
• dc.language.iso eng
• dc.publisher Wiley
• dc.relation.ispartof Journal of Economics and Management Strategy. 2024 Sep 23
• dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/1PE/ECO2016-76998-P
• dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/HE/101044072
• dc.rights This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.
• dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
• dc.rights.uri https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
• dc.subject.keyword Innovation
• dc.subject.keyword Kill zone
• dc.subject.keyword Platform
• dc.title The 'kill zone': when a platform copies to eliminate a potential threat
• dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
• dc.type.version info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion