Joseph Schumpeter Lecture: sharing a government

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  • dc.contributor.author Ventura, Jaume
  • dc.date.accessioned 2020-06-17T08:27:08Z
  • dc.date.available 2020-06-17T08:27:08Z
  • dc.date.issued 2019
  • dc.description.abstract This paper develops a simple theoretical framework to study a set of regions, each with its own regional government, who share a union or central government. These governments must decide whether to implement or discard a large number of projects that produce local benefits for the region that implements them, and externalities for the rest of the regions. Conflict or disagreement arises since different regions value projects differently. The classic assignment problem consists of deciding who decides these projects, either the union or the regional governments. It is well known that regional governments are insensitive to externalities. The key observation here is that the union government is insensitive to local benefits. Thus, each government maximizes only a piece of the value of projects, and disregards the other one. This observation leads to simple and clear rules for solving the assignment problem.
  • dc.description.sponsorship I acknowledge financial support from the Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI), through the European Research Council (ERC), under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Programme,Grant Agreement 693512 (“Globalization, Economic Policy and Political Structure”), the Generalitat de Catalunya (CERCA program and grant 2014 SGR 830), and the Barcelona GSE.
  • dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
  • dc.identifier.citation Ventura J. Joseph Schumpeter Lecture: sharing a government. J Eur Econ Assoc. 2019 Dec;17(6):1723-52. DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvz066
  • dc.identifier.doi http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvz066
  • dc.identifier.issn 1542-4766
  • dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/45003
  • dc.language.iso eng
  • dc.publisher Oxford University Press
  • dc.relation.ispartof J Eur Econ Assoc. 2019 Dec;17(6):1723-52. DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvz066
  • dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/H2020/693512
  • dc.rights © The Author(s) 2019. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of European Economic Association. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
  • dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
  • dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
  • dc.subject.other Administració central
  • dc.subject.other Autonomia
  • dc.subject.other Regionalisme
  • dc.subject.other Unió Europea, Països de la -- Política i govern -- Presa de decisions
  • dc.subject.other Descentralització administrativa
  • dc.title Joseph Schumpeter Lecture: sharing a government
  • dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
  • dc.type.version info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion