The mytery of the printing press monetary policy and self-fulfilling debt crises

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• dc.contributor.author Corsetti, Giancarloca
• dc.contributor.author Dedola, Lucaca
• dc.date.accessioned 2016-12-07T10:29:50Z
• dc.date.available 2016-12-07T10:29:50Z
• dc.date.issued 2016-07
• dc.description.abstract We study the conditions under which unconventional (balance-sheet) monetary policy can rule out self-fulfilling sovereign default in a model with optimizing but discretionary scale and monetary policymakers. When purchasing sovereign debt, the central bank effectively swaps risky government paper for monetary liabilities only exposed to inflation risk, thus yielding a lower interest rate. As central bank purchases reduce the (ex ante) costs of debt, we characterize a critical threshold beyond which, absent fundamental fiscal stress, the government strictly prefers primary surplus adjustment to default. Because default may still occur for fundamental reasons, however, the central bank faces the risk of losses on sovereign debt holdings, which may generate inefficient inflation. We show that these losses do not necessarily undermine the credibility of a backstop, nor the monetary authorities´ ability to pursue its inflation objectives. Backstops are credible if either the central bank enjoys fiscal backing or fiscal authorities are sufficiently averse to inflation.ca
• dc.description.sponsorship The ADEMU Working Paper Series is being supported by the European Commission Horizon 2020 European Union funding for Research & Innovation, grant agreement No 649396.
• dc.format.mimetype application/pdfca
• dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/27703
• dc.language.iso engca
• dc.relation.ispartofseries ADEMU Working Paper Series;35
• dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/H2020/649396
• dc.rights This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International, which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium provided that the original work is properlyattributed.ca
• dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessca
• dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ca
• dc.subject.keyword Sovereign risk and defaulten
• dc.subject.keyword Lender of last resorten
• dc.subject.keyword Seigniorageen
• dc.subject.keyword Inflationary financingen
• dc.title The mytery of the printing press monetary policy and self-fulfilling debt crisesca
• dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperca