Distributive justice, political legitimacy, and independent central banks

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• dc.contributor.author Ferret Mas, Josep
• dc.date.accessioned 2024-01-08T06:55:22Z
• dc.date.available 2024-01-08T06:55:22Z
• dc.date.issued 2023
• dc.description.abstract The Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 exacerbated two distinct concerns about the independence of central banks: a concern about legitimacy and a concern about economic justice. This paper explores the legitimacy of independent central banks from the perspective of these two concerns, by presenting two distinct models of central banking and their different claims to political legitimacy and distributive justice. I argue primarily that we should avoid construing central bank independence in binary terms, such that central banks either are, or are not, independent. I will argue that we should instead construe central bank independence in scalar terms, so that independence admits of degree, thus allowing us to develop an account of independence in which central banks can retain it to the extent necessary for economic efficiency, while meeting reasonable concerns regarding democratic legitimacy and economic justice.
• dc.description.sponsorship Open Access funding provided thanks to the CRUE-CSIC agreement with Springer Nature. The research leading to these results received funding from the Justice, Legitimacy, and International Institutions Research Group supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Ref. DER 2016-80471-C2-2-R)-- Extension in 2019 and 2021. It also received funding from the Leverhulme Trust Doctoral Programme in Climate Justice at the University of Reading.
• dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
• dc.identifier.citation Ferret Mas J. Distributive justice, political legitimacy, and independent central banks. Res Publica. 2023;30:249-66. DOI: 10.1007/s11158-023-09619-x
• dc.identifier.doi http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11158-023-09619-x
• dc.identifier.issn 1356-4765
• dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/58630
• dc.language.iso eng
• dc.publisher Springer
• dc.relation.ispartof Res Publica. 2023;30:249-66.
• dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/1PE/2016-80471-C2-2-R
• dc.rights © The Author(s) 2023 This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
• dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
• dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• dc.subject.keyword Central bank independence
• dc.subject.keyword Political legitimacy
• dc.subject.keyword Monetary policy
• dc.subject.keyword Financial crisis
• dc.subject.keyword Distributive justice
• dc.title Distributive justice, political legitimacy, and independent central banks
• dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
• dc.type.version info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion