Authoritarian regimes and civil–military relations: explaining counterbalancing in autocracies

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• dc.contributor.author Escribà-Folch, Abel
• dc.contributor.author Böhmelt, Tobias
• dc.contributor.author Pilster, Ulrich
• dc.date.accessioned 2021-03-15T10:14:02Z
• dc.date.available 2021-03-15T10:14:02Z
• dc.date.issued 2020
• dc.description Includes supplemental material for the online appendix
• dc.description.abstract How do autocracies structure their civil–military relations? We contend that personalist dictators are more strongly associated with counterbalancing than other authoritarian regime types. Personalists are characterized by weak institutions and narrow support bases, a lack of unifying ideologies and informal links to the ruler. They thus have strong incentives to coup-proof and, as we contend, counterbalancing seems particularly attractive. Quantitative analyses of autocratic regimes’ counterbalancing efforts since the 1960s provide support for this expectation. By showing that institutional coup-proofing significantly varies across autocratic forms of government, we contribute to the literature on comparative authoritarianism and civil–military relations.
• dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
• dc.identifier.citation Escribà-Folch A, Böhmelt T, Pilster U. Authoritarian regimes and civil–military relations: explaining counterbalancing in autocracies. Conflict Management and Peace Science. 2020;37(5):559-79. DOI: 10.1177/0738894219836285
• dc.identifier.doi http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0738894219836285
• dc.identifier.issn 0738-8942
• dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/46774
• dc.language.iso eng
• dc.publisher SAGE Publications
• dc.relation.ispartof Conflict Management and Peace Science. 2020;37(5):559-79
• dc.relation.isreferencedby https://doi.org/10.25384/SAGE.7976693.v1
• dc.rights Escribà-Folch A, Böhmelt T, Pilster U, Authoritarian regimes and civil–military relations: explaining counterbalancing in autocracies, Conflict Management and Peace Science (Volume: 37 issue: 5) pp. 559-79. Copyright © 2019 SAGE Publications. DOI: 10.1177/0738894219836285.
• dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
• dc.subject.keyword Autocracies
• dc.subject.keyword Civil–military relations
• dc.subject.keyword Counterbalancing
• dc.subject.keyword Coup-proofing
• dc.subject.keyword Quantitative analysis
• dc.title Authoritarian regimes and civil–military relations: explaining counterbalancing in autocracies
• dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
• dc.type.version info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion