Decision-making in the European Union – or, the meticulous design of power dispersion

Karagiannis, Yannis

doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.18543/ced-55-2016pp119-143

Decision-making in the European Union – or, the meticulous design of power dispersion

Citation

Karagiannis Y. Decision-making in the European Union - or, the meticulous design of power dispersion. Cuadernos Europeos de Deusto. 2016;(55):119-43. DOI: 10.18543/ced-55-2016pp119-143

Abstract

How does the European Union («EU ») make decisions? Is power concentrated or dispersed? Who should those interested in EU legislative affairs observe or try to influence? To answer these questions this article reviews the main legislative procedures of the EU using a standard rational choice approach. It does so by looking at both inter-institutional politics between the Commission, the Council, and the Parliament, and intra-institutional politics within each of these institutions. I make three main arguments, two positive and one negative. On the positive side (a) it can be shown that the EU is characterized by a calculated dispersion of power; and (b) despite its limitations, the rational choice approach to decision-making analysis does a satisfactory job in explaining EU procedures, including when some actors’ decisions seem a priori irrational. On the negative side, the dispersion of power which characterizes the EU makes popular heuristic theories such as principal-agent inappropriate.