The second person perspective

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  • dc.contributor.author Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín
  • dc.date.accessioned 2024-03-15T07:11:22Z
  • dc.date.available 2024-03-15T07:11:22Z
  • dc.date.issued 2021
  • dc.description.abstract Recent philosophical developments on personal indexicals reveal a disagreement between those who defend and those who deny the existence of a distinctive class of second person thoughts. In this piece, I tackle this controversy by highlighting two crucial constraints based on paradigmatic felicitous singular uses of the second person pronoun. On the one hand, the Addressing Constraint is brought out by the awareness and action capabilities displayed in successfully addressing another. On the other hand, the Merging Constraint arises, among other things, from the fact that ‘I’/‘you’-exchanges ground intersubjective disagreement. Once these constraints are fully in view, I go on to show that they pose a challenging dilemma for any account of the second person and that the chasm between friends and foes of the distinctness of second person thought is better seen as endorsements of one of the horns of the dilemma. In reaction to this, I outline a way of accommodating both constraints in terms of ‘perspectives’, i.e. ways of thinking of a reference that do not individuate a thought. On the recommended approach, the second person perspective is cognitively distinctive but does not itself signal the existence of a distinctive second person type of thought. By contrast, a single type of thought about selves expressible with personal indexicals—the self-thought type—can be shown to comprise the third, the second and, perhaps surprisingly, the first person perspective. Unlike other perspectival approaches, the here proposed analysis relies on an elucidation of perspectives in terms of specific information on which a thinker draws made available by a concept-individuating reference rule.
  • dc.description.sponsorship This research has been generously supported by the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Government of Spain) and the European Union through the research Projects FFI2016‐80588‐R and FFI2015‐63892‐P (MINECO, AEI/FEDER, EU), as well as the Secretary for Universities and Research of the Department of Economy and Knowledge (Government of Catalonia).
  • dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
  • dc.identifier.citation Verdejo VM. The second person perspective. Erkenntnis. 2021;86:1693-711. DOI: 10.1007/s10670-019-00177-4
  • dc.identifier.doi http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-019-00177-4
  • dc.identifier.issn 0165-0106
  • dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/59423
  • dc.language.iso eng
  • dc.publisher Springer
  • dc.relation.ispartof Erkenntnis. 2021;86:1693-711.
  • dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/1PE/FFI2016‐805
  • dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/1PE/FFI2016‐80588‐R
  • dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/1PE/FFI2015‐63892‐P
  • dc.rights This version of the article has been accepted for publication, after peer review (when applicable) and is subject to Springer Nature’s AM terms of use, but is not the Version of Record and does not reflect post-acceptance improvements, or any corrections. The Version of Record is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-019-00177-4
  • dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
  • dc.title The second person perspective
  • dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
  • dc.type.version info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion

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