Mostra el registre parcial de l'element Apesteguia, Jose Ballester, Miguel A. Ferrer, Rosa
dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa 2017-07-26T10:50:37Z 2017-07-26T10:50:37Z 2006-11-01
dc.description.abstract What are the best voting systems in terms of utilitarianism? Or in terms of maximin, or maximax? We study these questions for the case of three alternatives and a class of structurally equivalent voting rules. We show that plurality, arguably the most widely used voting system, performs very poorly in terms of remarkable ideals of justice, such as utilitarianism or maximin, and yet is optimal in terms of maximax. Utilitarianism is best approached by a voting system converging to the Borda count, while the best way to achieve maximin is by means of a voting system converging to negative voting. We study the robustness of our results across different social cultures, measures of performance, and population sizes.
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 987
dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
dc.title On the justice of voting systems
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper 2017-07-23T02:10:47Z
dc.subject.keyword voting
dc.subject.keyword scoring rules
dc.subject.keyword utilitarianism
dc.subject.keyword maximin
dc.subject.keyword maximax
dc.subject.keyword impartial culture condition
dc.subject.keyword Microeconomics
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

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