On the justice of voting systems

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  • dc.contributor.author Apesteguía, Joséca
  • dc.contributor.author Ballester, Miguel A.ca
  • dc.contributor.author Ferrer, Rosaca
  • dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
  • dc.date.accessioned 2017-07-26T10:50:37Z
  • dc.date.available 2017-07-26T10:50:37Z
  • dc.date.issued 2006-11-01
  • dc.date.modified 2017-07-23T02:10:47Z
  • dc.description.abstract What are the best voting systems in terms of utilitarianism? Or in terms of maximin, or maximax? We study these questions for the case of three alternatives and a class of structurally equivalent voting rules. We show that plurality, arguably the most widely used voting system, performs very poorly in terms of remarkable ideals of justice, such as utilitarianism or maximin, and yet is optimal in terms of maximax. Utilitarianism is best approached by a voting system converging to the Borda count, while the best way to achieve maximin is by means of a voting system converging to negative voting. We study the robustness of our results across different social cultures, measures of performance, and population sizes.
  • dc.format.mimetype application/pdfca
  • dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=987
  • dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/720
  • dc.language.iso eng
  • dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 987
  • dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
  • dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
  • dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
  • dc.subject.keyword voting
  • dc.subject.keyword scoring rules
  • dc.subject.keyword utilitarianism
  • dc.subject.keyword maximin
  • dc.subject.keyword maximax
  • dc.subject.keyword impartial culture condition
  • dc.subject.keyword Microeconomics
  • dc.title On the justice of voting systemsca
  • dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper